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Preface. 
The subject of this dissertation is photography and gender identity. 
The reason why I chose the topic of identity is that it has always fascinated me. It is an 
immensely diverse subject where scholars from many fields have made important 
contributions. I had first hand experience with it and the problems that may follow when I 
worked as a doctor in general practice and in psychiatric wards. I also had the chance to meet 
more people with alternative gender identities when I studied sexology at Høgskolen i Agder. 
Some of the people I have met were quite happy and well adjusted, while others suffered. 
Somehow I wanted to alleviate that suffering, which was often caused by the ignorance and 
hostility of the rest of society. I still do, as will probably be evident throughout this 
dissertation. 
It seems to me that photography is well suited to tell the story of outsiders. It has a close link 
to reality, and thus to truthfulness. At the same time it is ubiquitous and greatly influences on 
us all. 
 
I want to thank my supervisor at IFIKK, Øivind Storm Bjerke, for valuable advice, my 
teachers at Høgkolen i Agder for inspiration, and all the transgender people I have met for 
broadening my mind. 
 
 
Oslo, April 2007. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
1.1 Author’s intention. 
Nan Goldin states in the introduction to the photo-book The Other Side that her sole purpose 
with the pictures is to pay homage to her transgender friends and to show everyone how 
beautiful they are1. She insists that we should accept these people on their own terms without 
judging them on the basis of our mental preconceptions as to what gender should and should 
not be. 
In my dissertation I employ many such mental preconceptions. They are part of my theoretical 
framework. Nonetheless I do subscribe to Goldin’s hope that these people be accepted as they 
are, regardless of prevailing discourse or theory. It is my intention to show that neither 
discourse nor theory offers any plausible arguments against a tolerant attitude towards gender 
variety. This may seem like a bold and perhaps questionable statement, but I do hope that my 
reasons for making it will become clear in the course of this dissertation. 
My ideological stance as someone who wishes to better the situation for people of 
unconventional gender identity will be evident throughout. My dissertation thus has an 
ideological basis – and bias. It is this basis that is the reason why I chose this topic in the first 
place. It influences my selection of image material and all of my deliberations. I realise that 
someone with a different view might have made quite different choices and arrived at other 
conclusions. I have no problems with that, seeing that my dissertation is meant as a personal 
reflection on a photographical work guided by a subjective ideological stance. It is not meant 
to offer any authoritative or “scientific” truths. My interpretative and theoretical deliberations 
are more in the vein of speculation. While I fully appreciate the right of other people to 
indulge in speculations of their own, it is my hope that my writings may inspire readers to 
reflect on and question the convoluted concepts of gender and gender identity. 
Discarding unwarranted preconceptions of gender may at first feel like losing one’s footing – 
an unpleasant sensation. But I do believe that when it is regained the world will feel like a 
more diverse and interesting place to live in. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 My edition is Goldin, Nan: The Other Side, Scalo 1993/2000. (First published in 1992.) 
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1.2 Thesis. 
One main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whether or not the photographs of Nan 
Goldin in the photo-book The Other Side correlate to the gender discourse from 1970 to the 
early 1990s. Do the pictures in the book illustrate changes in the conception of gender identity 
during that time period? 
Another main purpose is to discuss more explicitly photography’s relationship to gender 
identity formation. Can photography aid in the creation and affirming of identity positions? If 
so, in what way can it do it? Can photography be detrimental to identity positions, and if so, 
how? 
These are the main questions that I will posit in this paper, and that I hopefully will be able to 
suggest answers to. 
 
 
1.3 Delineation of the dissertation’s subject matter. 
My analysis will concentrate on pictorial and contextual elements that pertain to gender 
issues. It would be possible to discuss Goldin with a different focus – such as for instance 
family photography or snapshot photography – but since that has not been my main interest 
here those venues will mainly be touched upon only as they relate to issues of gender identity. 
I have not analysed all the photographs in the book. I have made a selection, based on the 
photos’ ability to illustrate major points in my discussion. This means that many pictures, and 
sometimes even whole sections, have been left out. The reasons for my selecting each picture 
will hopefully become evident as I discuss them in the exposition (chapter 2). 
The selected pictures are all reproduced at the back of this dissertation (chapter 5). 
 
 
1.4 Sources. 
My primary source is Nan Goldin’s photo-book The Other Side. 
I have also used some of her other photo-books and exposition catalogues. 
I have used material from other photographic artists when appropriate, such as pictures by 
Jacob Riis, Weegee, Robert Frank, Larry Clark, Christer Strömholm and Mary Ellen Mark. 
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Literature on photography is part of my contextual and theoretical framework, as are writings 
on feminist, psychoanalytical, philosophical and linguistic topics2. 
 
 
1.5 Method. 
I make a formal and iconographic analysis of the selected pictures. I make a contextual 
analysis on the basis of my theoretical premises. In both the formal, the iconographic and the 
contextual analysis I try to show how Goldin’s photos may illustrate contemporary gender 
theory and -issues. I make a comparative analysis of the 1970s pictures versus the post 1990 
ones and relate it to issues of gender and gender identity. I compare Goldin’s work to pictures 
by other artists that are relevant to my deliberations (Jacob Riis, Weegee, Robert Frank, Larry 
Clark, Christer Strömholm and Mary Ellen Mark). 
Where pertinent to my analysis I will include biographical data of the artist. 
 
 
1.6 Theoretical and artistic contributors. 
In the course of the exposition (chapter 2) the theories and concepts of my main contributors 
will be expounded in greater detail. What follows is a brief introduction to theses and work 
pertinent to my deliberations. 
I try to relate all my theoretical discussions closely to the medium of photography generally 
and to Goldin’s pictures in The Other Side specifically. 
 
 
1.6.1 Feminism, psychoanalysis, Foucauldian critique and their relation 
to gender identity. 
Feminism and psychoanalysis are among the main pillars of my theoretical deliberations. The 
main figures are psychoanalysts Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, and feminist Judith 
Butler. 
                                                 
2
 See chapter 1.6. 
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I proceed from Sigmund Freud’s statement that gender differentiation relies on a bodily organ 
– the penis, and that from the appreciation of its presence or absence arise men and women, 
each with quite different traits and personalities. I explore the implications of Freud’s theories 
for men, women and alternative gender identities. 
I reiterate the feminist critique of Freud, and the welcoming of the Lacanian reworking of 
Freudian theory. In Lacan, gender differentiation hinges not on any bodily organ, but on a 
phantasmatic entity called the Phallus – the symbol of plenitude and ultimate mastery. The 
Phallus was deemed suitable by feminists for appropriation and re-signification, allowing for 
new gender differentiation models. This was of importance to women and alternative gender 
identities alike. 
In Butler sex and gender has lost all connection to the physical as she deems them to be 
purely social and cultural constructions. Gender, according to Butler, is not something we are, 
but something we do – it is performative. It does not represent any inner, stable psychic entity. 
It is furthermore defined by the parameters of what she calls “compulsory heterosexuality” in 
a patriarchal society, and Butler calls for subversion of the gender system in order to facilitate 
alternative gender identities. I analyse the implications of Butler’s views for transgender 
people. 
I reiterate and follow up on Michel Foucault’s analysis of the discourse on sex and gender, 
and the impact it had on the authority of gender systems3. 
I expand on the Lacanian Order of the Real suggesting an alternative basis for subjective 
gender experience. 
 
 
1.6.2 Documentary photography and the depiction of “the Other”. 
I discuss how the subject matter of documentary photography has evolved – due both to 
political incentives and to a new aesthetic starting with Walt Whitman – to include depiction 
of groups and individuals deemed to be outsiders and alien, and how these may be constructed 
as Other. I recapitulate different approaches to the depiction of the Other (in Jacob Riis, 
Weegee, Robert Frank, Larry Clark, Christer Strömholm and Mary Ellen Mark), and the 
implication for photography of transgender people. 
                                                 
3
 The term gender system is explained in chapter 2.1. 
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I posit a fundamental difference between documentary photography based on what Freud 
called the projection of id urges and the fetish, and one based on a comprehensive narrative 
approach. The former I call fetishistic photography, and claim that it may be detrimental to 
the process of gender identity formation. The latter, which I call narrative photography, I find 
to be much better suited to help stabilize and affirm identity positions. 
 
 
1.7 Presentation of the subject of study. 
In my paper I will analyse the pictures in the photo-book The Other Side by the American 
photographer Nan Goldin. It contains a number of black-and-white and colour pictures taken 
between 1972 and 1992. Their subjects are all people who were born as biological males and 
who are in different stages of feminisation. Although their gender status ranges from 
transsexuals to transvestites to drag queens – or a mixture, I usually refer to them collectively 
as gender-crossers or transgender people4. I use feminine pronouns, as they seem to express 
the experienced mental gender identity. The names and designations of the subjects I have 
chosen to write in italics. 
The pictures from the 1970s are all in black-and-white, and the ones from 1980 onwards are 
all in colour. 
The photo-book is divided into seven sections: 
The first section, called The Other Side, consists of photos from 1972-74, taken for the most 
part at The Other Side nightclub in Boston, USA. The club was a meeting-place for 
transgender people, and arranged drag performances and drag beauty contests. The photos 
portray Goldin’s close transgender friends of this period. 
The second section, entitled Greer, is shot in New York City in the years 1981-87. They 
feature Goldin’s transgender friend Greer. 
                                                 
4
 A transsexual is someone who experiences a discrepancy between his/her biological body (genitals etc) and 
his/her psychological gender identity. Often the person will seek to have the body medically altered (by hormone 
treatment, surgery etc) to fit the mental gender identity. A transvestite is a person who dresses like members of 
the opposite sex. Often the cross-dressing has a component of sexual arousal. A drag queen is a biological male 
who performs in stage acts portraying members of the opposite sex – often in a hyperbolic and parodic fashion. 
They usually portray people from the entertainment industry, such as singers and film stars. The terms gender-
crossers and transgender people generally refer to those who in one way or other cross the boundary between the 
two sexes. 
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The third section, Hi Girl!, consists of pictures taken 1990-91 of other Goldin transgender 
friends. They are taken in New York City, Paris and Berlin. 
The fourth section, Kim, is taken in Paris in 1991-92. 
The fifth section, called The Queen and I, is photographed in Manila in the Philippines in 
1992. 
The sixth section is untitled and taken at the Second Tip bar in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1992. 
The seventh section, Joey, features another transgender friend of Goldin’s, and is taken in 
New York City and Berlin in 1991 and 1992. 
From these sections I have, as mentioned in chapter 1.3, made a selection of photographs to 
analyse. 
 
 
1.8 Presentation of the artist. 
Nan Goldin was born in 1953 in the outskirts of Washington DC. Her parents were 
intellectuals. They were four children, of which the elder sister Barbara Holly was Nan’s soul-
mate and role-model. 
Disaster struck in 1965 when Barbara Holly committed suicide at the age of 18. The parents’ 
reaction of denial and their portraying the suicide as an accident, became formative to 
Goldin’s artistic work. She set out to relentlessly tell the truth, no matter how inconvenient or 
painful it might be. 
Nan started to photograph at the age of 16. Attending the alternative Sataya Community 
School in Lincoln, Massachusetts, she started working in a dark-room and developed a more 
conscious attitude towards photography. She recorded her own life and that of her friends in 
Polaroids. She became the school photographer. While inspired by fashion photography a la 
Vogue, her own pictures had the roughness of reportage. 
On moving to Boston in the early 1970s, she met a crowd of transgender people. Fascinated 
by them, she spent the next few years photographing them extensively and living in close 
proximity to them. In 1972 she had her first exhibition of black-and-white pictures of drag 
queens. 
She took a night course with Henry Horenstein at the New England School of Photography, 
and he opened her eyes to photography as an art form. As a result she enrolled in the School 
of The Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, and stayed there until she graduated in 1977 with a 
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Bachelor of Fine Arts degree. At the same time she lost touch with her Boston transgender 
crowd. 
The so-called “Boston school” of photographers included artists like Philip-Lorca di Corcia, 
Jack Pierson and David Armstrong – the latter a long time close friend of Goldin’s. During 
these years she started using a Pentax camera and a flash and she started taking colour 
photographs. Inspired by the commercial glitz of Guy Bourdin and loving the artificial light, 
the pictures took on her well-known intensity of bright colours. 
Moving to New York City in 1978, she settled in the destitute precinct of the Bowery. While 
commercially unsuccessful in the first New York years she made lasting connections to artist 
Joel Meyerowitz, and Marvin Heiferman at Castelli Graphics. The latter included her in a 
1979 Castelli Graphics group exhibition, and when he left Castelli he became her long-time 
private dealer. 
Meanwhile Goldin had to sustain herself working as a bartender, and the odd clientele of her 
workplace and other shady establishments would be the subjects of The Ballad of Sexual 
Dependency – destined to be her most famous work. The Ballad was initially a slide-show 
with an accompanying soundtrack showed at Goldin’s own place and at underground clubs 
such as Rafik’s Underground Cinema, The Mudd Club and Tin Pan Alley. The audience were 
bar and club regulars – denizens of the New York underground – belonging to what Nan 
called her extended family. The slide-show format and soundtrack added to the narrative of 
the photographs, approximating them to cinema – Goldin’s favourite medium. 
In the mid-1980s came the breakthrough. In 1985 her work was included in the Biennal 
Exhibition at the Whitney Museum of American Art in New York City. The Ballad was 
shown at the Burden Gallery, NYC, the next year and published as a book5. It won the 
Photographic Book Prize of the Year in 1987. Goldin was awarded several prizes over the 
next years. 
Shocked by the effects of AIDS on her community, she curated the exhibition “Witnesses: 
Against Our Vanishing” in 1989 in New York. The same year she lost her long-time friend, 
the writer and performer Cookie Mueller, to the disease. Her anti-AIDS effort is probably her 
most political artistic endeavour, taking a definite stand instead of adhering to her usual code 
of telling the unbiased truth. 
While she had transgender friends in the 1980s – Greer was among them – her subjects of 
those years were mostly unknown artists and other desolate inhabitants of the New York 
                                                 
5
 Goldin, Nan: The Ballad of Sexual Dependency, Aperture Foundations Inc. 1986. 
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underworld. But in 1990 she met up with a new crowd of transgender people, starting a new 
extensive photographic project portraying them. The result was the slide-show and book 
(published in 1992) of The Other Side, spanning some twenty years of pictures of transgender 
people. 
International fame followed in the 1990s. She went to Berlin on a DAAD grant in 1991. She 
photographed transgender people there and in Paris. The Ballad of Sexual Dependency slide-
show toured Europe in 1993. She went to the Philippines and Thailand to photograph 
transgendereds in 1992, and in 1994 she published Tokyo Love – a series of portraits of 
Japanese youths – with Japanese photographer Nobuyoshi Araki6. 
A big retrospective at the Whitney Museum of American Art in New York City in 1996 was 
called I’ll Be Your Mirror. An extensive catalogue with the same name was published, and the 
exhibition toured Europe7. 
More exhibitions and more books followed. 
In later years her format has extended from single frame photos, slide shows and books to 
grids and installations to enhance the narrative of her work. She has kept her special blend of 
snapshot and deliberate, formal compositions, though with an emphasis on the latter in her 
recent work. Her subject matter has also expanded to encompass landscape, still life, domestic 
scenes and religious elements. Some of them have a lyrical, contemplative mood of memory 
and mourning, others celebrate harmony and friendship. Her colour palette is at times more 
subdued, and she has a renewed interest in natural light. 
The comprehensive photo-book The Devil’s Playground offers a good presentation of her 
recent work8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Goldin, Nan & Nobuyoshi Araki: Tokyo Love, Scalo 1995. (First published in 1994.) 
7
 Goldin, Nan: I’ll Be Your Mirror, Whitney Museum of American Art, New York 1996. 
8
 Goldin, Nan: The Devil’s Playground, Phaidon Press Limited 2003.  
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2. EXPOSITION. 
 
2.1 Conceptual considerations. 
There is something peculiar about the concepts of man and woman, male and female. What is 
peculiar is that most of us accept them at face value; they seem self-evident and self-
explanatory to us, in need of no further definition. In fact, we do this to such a high degree 
that any attempt at conceptual deconstruction is met in the general population with scepticism 
and ridicule. I believe that this is so, despite some forty years of modern feminism and gender 
theorizing. These movements no doubt have had an effect in the general populace when it 
comes to some aspects of gender, such as discrimination against the female sex, and to a 
certain degree what is considered proper behaviour in men and women. But the basis of it all, 
our gender system itself, is still firmly embedded in our minds. 
By gender system I refer to a more or less coherent and comprehensive body of thoughts and 
rules, written or otherwise, that define and delineate issues of gender in a given society at a 
particular point in time. The thoughts and rules are generally subscribed to by a vast majority 
of the population. Alternative notions on gender are often subdued or ignored. 
In current Western civilization we have a two-gender system; the notion is that there are two 
genders, and two alone. This system is based on difference. The two sexes, or genders, are 
defined by the way they differ from each other9. Now, the exact contents of these differing 
traits may have changed over time, but the basic assumption of the system (that there are two, 
and only two, opposite genders) remains. 
Strangely enough this is so, despite the fact that the system has been shown not to be as self-
evident and straightforward as it may seem. On every level of understanding, discrepancies 
occur and come to light. These all tend towards the abundance and proliferation of sexed and 
gendered concepts and identities, and point to the complex and sometimes contradictory 
nature of this field. 
I will recapitulate some of this complexity.  
There is the organic - or bodily - sex, often considered to be the most self-evident concept of 
them all. But even here, multiple layers and polymorphy abound. The organic sex is in itself 
                                                 
9
 They are often described as having opposite traits, much as in a Derridean binary. See for instance Gamble, 
Sarah: The Routledge Companion to Feminism and Postfeminism, Routledge 2001, page 216, or Graugaard, 
Christian: Sexleksikon, Rosinante Forlag A/S, København 2001, page 285. 
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multi-layered, consisting of (at least) a chromosomal, a hormonal, a neurological and an 
anatomical aspect10. Furthermore, these aspects shift their predominance during a person’s 
lifespan, with different implications for sexed development and maturation in, let’s say, the 
foetus, the pubescent and the grown up. These complex organic systems interact, and 
sometimes – more often than we should think – they produce unexpected results that do not fit 
within the two-gender system11. Examples are hermaphrodites, pseudo-hermaphrodites and 
intersex individuals, even people without any discernible sex at all12. Some of these organic 
interplays are very subtle, and quite often their mechanisms and effects are poorly understood.  
Let’s take the hormonal systems as an example. In foetal intrauterine growth they fashion the 
internal and external genitals in complex ways13. Sometimes they produce the variations 
mentioned above. But hormones also affect higher nervous functions and the brain. The way 
that this happens and which effects it produces is for the most part still a mystery to scientists. 
It is possible that the mechanisms are subtle and highly graded, producing effects on a sliding 
scale rather than an all or nothing scale, so that we should not speak of a male or a female 
brain, but rather of a more or less male or female brain. These hormonal changes of course 
continue after birth, producing the completion of primary sexual characteristics at puberty, as 
well as secondary sexual characteristics14. And it seems probable that they keep affecting 
multiple bodily systems throughout the individual’s life span. 
The hormonal system is just one example of how complex the seemingly self-evident bodily 
sex really is. 
Then there is what I call gendering. Gendering is the social process by which the two sexes 
don certain traits that are not in any simple or obvious way linked to their bodily sexual 
                                                 
10
 Literature on organic sex abounds within medicine and related subjects. I have mainly used Allgeier, Elisabeth 
Rice & Albert Richard Allgeier: Sexual Interactions, Houghton Mifflin Company 2000, and Almås, Elsa & 
Esben Esther Pirelli Benestad: Kjønn i bevegelse, Universitetsforlaget 2001, and Lundberg, Per Olov (ed): 
Sexologi, Liber AB 2002. 
11
 See for instance Almås & Pirelli Benestad, op.cit. 
12
 Hermaphrodites are people born with both male and female internal genitalia, and evidence of both male and 
female external genitalia. The condition is very rare. Pseudo-hermaphrodites are people born with a discrepancy 
between the sex chromosomes, the internal and the external genitalia. Both conditions are today mostly referred 
to as intersex conditions. See for instance Graugaard, op.cit. 
13
 See for instance Almås & Pirelli Benestad, op.cit., page 19-31 and 248. 
14
 See for instance Lundberg, op.cit., page 29-36. 
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characteristic15. Quite often a claim is made that they do have an organic correlate, but this is 
almost invariably due to misinterpretation of scientific data. Rather than being embedded in 
natural science, gendering is a cultural and social phenomenon, and the prime movers are 
diverse, sometimes connected to issues of power. 
Why then does the two gender system seem to function so well? It seems to adequately 
describe almost all of us, leaving only a negligible minority on the outside. This is a complex 
question with no simple answer. Two factors will be mentioned here: Firstly, there is a 
socializing and disciplining pressure towards the expression of two, and only two, genders 
that discourages the expression of other possibilities16. Secondly, and as a part of this, there is 
often a medical intervention at the birth of a child with non-conforming sex to correct nature’s 
“error” surgically, thereby assigning the child to one of the two possibilities, and ease the 
individual’s adaptation to the existing order. Thus one might say that the system is self-
perpetuating, excluding polymorphy. 
It is not as if one should perceive these strategies as entirely conscious attempts at 
manipulation. Sometimes they are based on deliberate wishes for power or the like, but quite 
often their agents have no such desires, claiming only to want to bring the “unnatural” back to 
what is “natural”. Indeed, the existing order of the two gender system does not feel like an 
“order” at all. It feels “natural” and self-evident, as I noted earlier. This is because the 
ideological content of the order has become invisible, automatic, disguised under the mantle 
of “naturalness”, “Nature” and inevitability. In other words, the ideology has become 
hegemonical17. Its invisibility is a proof of its success. 
What is revealing of the constructedness of this “natural order” is that it at times is 
implemented contrary to the organic tendency towards complexity, diversity and 
polymorphism. This is done by calling nature itself “unnatural”, or – under the guise of the 
modern paradigm – as diseased. In the modern paradigm, Nature is the golden standard. 
Nature is described as a clockwork that works according to laws of perfect harmony. These 
laws are there for us to discover and scrutinize (through the natural sciences), and ultimately 
control. Unfortunately, nature does not always act as Nature, deviating from the ideal that 
                                                 
15
 Judith Butler speaks of “girling” – the social process of leading the female child towards her status as woman. 
See for instance Salih, Sarah: Judith Butler, Routledge 2002, page 77-80. 
16
 This is an important point in Judith Butler’s gender differentiation theory. See Butler, Judith: Gender Trouble, 
Routledge 1999 (first published 1990), and Butler, Judith: Bodies that Matter, Routledge 1993, and Salih, op.cit. 
17
 See Brantsæter, Marianne C, Turid Eikvam, Reidar Kjær & Knut Olav Åmås (eds): Norsk homoforskning, 
Universitetsforlaget 2001, page 58 ff. 
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man has bestowed upon it. In that case, it is man’s duty to bring nature back to Nature, to 
restore it to its own ideal self18. 
Thus understood Nature can be understood as man’s projection of his own concepts of perfect 
harmony onto the world around him, a harmony that is not only perfect, but also intelligible to 
him. 
The effect of the modern paradigm in the sex and gender domain is the two gender system, 
with its perfect symmetry of identities. Man and woman have a different nature and different 
traits. These natures and these traits complete each other. What one lacks, the other one has, 
and vice versa. It is a picture of perfect harmony, intelligible and easily controlled. 
Any act that threatens to destabilize this symmetry must be avoided, or the result is chaos and 
loss of control. This may account, at least in part, for the enduring stability of the two gender 
system. 
 
Let us now turn to Nan Goldin. In The Other Side she is definitely leaving the two gender 
system behind, bringing chaos to our doorsteps. 
At the beginning of the book there is a picture that may serve as an illustration to my 
deliberations. It is the one called Roommate in the kitchen, and it is taken in Boston in 197219.  
It is a black-and-white photograph – like all the early ones – and is probably taken in daylight. 
No flash is used. It depicts a person in three-quarter body length. The subject is standing 
against a wall, a doorway behind her to her left, and a picture mounted on the wall to the 
right, next to the head. The wall is of light colour, but a dark field occupies the lower part of 
the picture – behind the subject’s lower body – possibly a piece of furniture, and at the 
picture’s left margin seems to be something that could be a mirror. The subject is wearing 
what seems to be a light, sleeveless dress, tied with a belt or chord at the waist, and is 
positioned in a frontal, contrappostal pose; the right hand placed on the hip, the left raised and 
flexed at the elbow, touching the doorpost behind the head; the look is directed straight at the 
camera.  
                                                 
18
 My deliberations on “nature” versus “Nature” is inspired by the idealization of the “natural” in the 18th century 
– see for instance Stenseth, Bodil: Ekteseng og bordell – om 1790-årenes seksualopplysning, Aschehoug 1997, 
and the scientific optimism of the 19th century (the world as intelligible, logical and in perfect harmony) – see for 
instance Olsen, Ole Andkjær & Simo Køppe: Freuds psykoanalyse, Gyldendal, Danmark 1990, page 23 ff. 
19
 Goldin: The Other Side, page 12. 
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The picture takes on a grainy, fussy quality. Details are lost. Therefore it is hard to make out 
the picture on the wall. It probably depicts a young girl in a dress, leaning on a piece of 
furniture, looking out of the picture plane. It is impossible to determine the medium. It seems 
to be significant, positioned as it is, right next to the protagonist’s head. 
Who is this protagonist? The caption says “roommate”. Further clues are found in Goldin’s 
introduction to the book. There she describes how she in 1972 met a group of people – drag 
queens – and that she was immediately infatuated with them. She goes on to say:  
 
I fell in love with one of the queens and within a few months moved in with Ivy and another 
friend.20 
 
Now, from other captioned pictures, we know that the “roommate” in this photo is not “Ivy”. 
So it is reasonable to assume that this is the other friend that Goldin mentions. 
That means that the subject in the Roommate in the kitchen picture is a drag queen – that is, a 
biological male dressing as and impersonating a woman. This of course comes as no surprise, 
seeing that drag queens are the subject of the The Other Side. We do not know, however, the 
exact sex or gender identity of roommate . Even though Goldin refers to them collectively as 
drag queens, her book features a plethora of gender variations. Some are transvestites, some 
are pre- or post-operative transsexuals, and some are “mere” entertainers. The only thing we 
know is that roommate is some kind of gender-crosser.  
What may come as a surprise is the seeming naturalness of the femininity of the protagonist. 
The term “drag queen” does have associations to theatricality and props of femininity. Not so 
in the roommate picture. In fact, were it not for the context in which the photograph is 
presented, it might very well be a depiction of any one woman.  
This becomes even more tangible when we turn to another roommate picture: Roommate in 
her chair21. Also taken in Boston in 1972, this depicts the same person seated sideways in an 
armchair, looking straight at the camera. The focus is sharper, much more of the details are 
revealed – and what is revealed seems like the epitome of femininity. The curled hair is tied 
up in a knot, some strands still fall gently framing a beautiful, heart-shaped face with full lips, 
almond shaped eyes, fine eyebrows, and skin without a blemish. There is little or no make up, 
underpinning the impression of naturalness. The body is slim, the pose relaxed, and the attire 
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is that ultimate female garment: the simple, but elegant summer dress. The limbs are long and 
slender, flexed at the elbows, wrists and knees, the delicate hands softly placed on the body, 
the legs crossed. The dress stops halfway down the thighs; it is long enough to be decent, but 
short enough to reveal the elegant, sensual legs. This picture oozes with feminine qualities: 
beauty, sensuality, softness – and naturalness. No one would – taken out of context – suggest 
that this is a picture of “nature gone wild”, that it represents those crimes against Nature that 
need to be corrected. On the contrary: this would qualify as a representation of Nature at its 
peak, as the ideal Womanhood. Interestingly, it does so to such a high degree that it is easy 
not to notice one discrepancy: the roommate has no breasts. That most female of body parts is 
in fact missing. So how can it be an ultimate expression of Womanhood, when the most 
crucial of female attributes are not there? In fact, most of the things that we would consider 
female are not really there. Yet it seems like an ideal depiction of Womanhood. 
This is a testament to the subversive power of the artist and her subjects, and may be seen as a 
critique of the intelligibility and self-evidence of the existing gender system.  
 
It is interesting to compare the two roommate photographs. 
In doing so, the kitchen picture now suddenly seems to have lost some of its naturalness. In 
fact, it now seems almost like a symbol, a symbol of Womanhood.  
The pose, with one hand on the hip, one on the doorpost, and the body swaying in a 
contrappostal S line, has a sensual quality, and makes ancient renderings of Venus in the bath 
come to mind. Indeed, the dress seems almost like an ancient Greek chiton22. The picture on 
the wall adds a narrative tinge. The little girl may hint at the origin of the protagonist as a 
“true” and “original” female, at the same time stressing her vulnerability. The doorway may 
be seen as a symbol of change, of passage through life, or simply an allusion to the unknown 
or the mysterious – indicating that there are things in life that we cannot fully understand, 
things that we simply must accept. The riddle of womanhood may be one such thing. The 
fussy quality of the photograph evokes an almost Pictorialist ambience – quite consistent with 
the symbolical and narrative content of the photograph23.  
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It is as if Goldin presents this individual to us with the intention of making us conceive of her 
as an archetypal woman - using a number of authoritative means to do so: gestures that are 
feminine beyond a doubt, allusions to classical beauty, narrative to substantiate origin and 
establish recognition and sympathy on the part of the spectator, symbolism implying the 
mystery and versatility of the human condition, and technical strategies aligning the picture 
with a High Art school of photography. 
By using such means, the femaleness she establishes takes on an abstract quality, almost like a 
platonic idea, a possibility, still not existing in the world. The Platonic idea not yet 
materialized, so to say. In terms that I used earlier in this chapter, she is presented to us not as 
nature, but as Nature. That such a mishap of nature could be construed as part of ideal Nature, 
is to lash out at the system of ideal Nature itself. It is utterly subversive.   
 
Let us return to the Roommate in her chair picture. It has retained its naturalness. If we look 
closely at the gestures, like we did in the previous example, we may see small vestiges of 
“deliberate” femininity – deliberate in the sense that they seem a little exaggerated. The 
position of the right hand for instance, with the flexed wrist and the fingers gently resting on 
the shoulder. 
Still, the overall effect is one of natural femininity. We have already mentioned the lack of 
make up, the simple dress and the relaxed pose. The subject is also situated among objects – 
an armchair, a lamp, a plant and a little piece of cloth on the wall – that do not seem overtly 
symbolical or allegorical. They look like everyday and straightforward objects. As opposed to 
the kitchen picture, these objects do not remove the protagonist from the here and now. On the 
contrary, they seem to anchor her in a tangible reality. That reality is in fact her home, the 
place where she lives. We are told that she is sitting in “her chair”, emphasizing precisely the 
connection to her own, lived life. Thus this picture is firmly set in place and time. The 
technical execution underpins the impression – the fussy quality is gone, and the details are 
rendered much sharper. 
All in all, this looks like a straight photography24. This is also very fitting. This picture shows 
the roommate as the materialized, concrete woman, living in the here and now. The Platonic 
idea made flesh. Where the kitchen photograph showed us the transcendent Woman, as part of 
idealized Nature, the chair one shows us the immanent woman, living and breathing among 
us. 
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One might think that Goldin wanted to tell us that roommate and others like her exist both as 
possibility and potential, and as real living beings, and that they are beautiful and worthy of 
our recognition. In both pictures, the roommate looks out of the picture, straight at the 
spectator, expecting just that. 
 
The designation “roommate” requires some words. Most of Goldin’s subjects are named, 
either by their artistic name or by their first name. But this individual is called only 
“roommate”. This would seem to detract from the person’s existence in the here and now. 
Anonymity tends towards transcendence and the archetypal.  
We do not know why Goldin has chosen not to tell us her name. Perhaps the roommate didn’t 
want to be named. Or perhaps it is to indicate a special relationship between them. By using 
the designation “roommate”, we are told that the subject and the artist were close, that they in 
fact lived together. This points to intimacy, to a relationship between real people in the here 
and now. This would stress the immanent tendencies of the chair picture. 
In this way, the designation “roommate” could both signify anonymity, emphasizing the 
transcendental qualities of the kitchen picture, or intimacy, underlining the immanence of the 
chair picture.  
 
I have now analysed two pictures from The Other Side in order to illustrate some of the 
problems concerning sex and gender issues. Is such an analysis tenable? Was this in Goldin’s 
mind when she took the pictures? 
In the The Other Side introduction she writes about her intentions in photographing her 
friends: 
 
I wanted to pay homage, to show them how beautiful they were. I never saw them as men 
dressing as women, but as something entirely different – a third gender that made more sense 
than either of the other two. I accepted them as they saw themselves: I had no desire to 
unmask them with my camera.25 
 
Admiration and a wish to show the world their qualities are her reasons. She does not 
conceive of them as men, or women, but as something else. She mentions that she sees them 
as a “third gender”. This concept is not neutral. In fact, it was applied to (feminine) male 
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homosexuals in the nineteenth century sexologic discourse, theorizing that they were men 
with too much female hormones26. It is doubtful whether this is what Goldin had in mind. 
Rather, I think she uses the term just to emphasize that they are something different. It would 
seem that she feels no need to explain the matter further. She takes them at face value, without 
any further questioning or need for explanation. Her message to us is: We should not 
scrutinize. We should simply accept. Sadly, the world does not concur. Acceptance is far from 
ubiquitous. Scrutiny and theorizing may indeed be employed as a means of raising the level of 
awareness and acceptance that Goldin calls for.  
Besides, Mrs Goldin is not totally consistent herself. On page 35 in The Other Side there is 
another picture of roommate. It is taken in Boston in 1973. This time she is not alone; there is 
another person present in the photograph. It seems to be a woman. One could certainly 
analyse this photograph extensively. Suffice it to say in this context that there are similarities 
and symmetries between the two – the stance, the right hand on the hip, the gaze. Even the 
faces look similar. The caption reads Sisters. This may be a picture of roommate with her 
carnal sister – the facial likeness would seem to indicate that. But what is important to us now 
is that Goldin calls them sisters. In other words, she assigns a feminine noun to the roommate. 
This would seem to indicate that she thinks of her not as a third gender or something different 
entirely, but as a female. On the other hand, feminine designations are appropriated by certain 
parts of the male gay community to name gay men27.  
I am not sure which, if any of these two, applications Goldin had in mind. But such intricacies 
does seem to point to the tangled web that constitutes sexed and gendered existence, and that 
is exactly what this chapter has sought to do. 
 
 
2.2 Gender systems, feminism and transgender identity. 
In chapter 2.1 I suggested that Goldin’s photographs can be employed to undermine the two-
gender system. They show us that the system is not as self-evident as we would like to think. 
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Another factor that weakens the system’s claim to naturalness and universal validity is the 
fact that it seems to have a discrete beginning in time, prior to which it did not exist. In other 
words, it has a history28. 
American historian Thomas Laqueur states that in the eighteenth century there was a change 
in the way that sexual difference was conceived29. He claims that prior to the eighteenth 
century there was really just one sex/gender – the male - and that females were not considered 
to possess a sex/gender of their own. Rather they were thought of as incomplete and defective 
men.  
Such a one-gender system was partly based on the biblical rendering of how God created 
humans30. He created man first, and then woman, using tissue from the man. Adam was prior 
to Eve, and Eve was a product of Adam. Eve was “posterior and inferior”. Eve was moreover 
burdened with sin, as she was the one who tempted Adam to eat the forbidden fruit. Thus she 
was also lacking in moral qualities.  
But the system also had roots in ancient Greece. Paramount was the theory of conception 
expounded by Aristotle31. He claimed that women contributed to conception only to a very 
small degree. Aristotle thought that semen was a condensation of the blood, concentrated to a 
point that maximized its life force and creative potential. Semen carried the psyché (soul, life) 
and pneuma (a divine, spiritual substance). According to the humoral theory women were 
“cold-wet-passive” and men were “warm-dry-active”. The heat and activity of the men was 
necessary to “boil down” the blood into semen. Women lacked the ability to concentrate their 
blood into semen, and hence they were essentially impotent in the sense that they could not 
create life. Aristotle nevertheless did reject the idea that men contribute to every aspect of the 
conception and that women were just incubators of sorts. This would not explain why some 
children look like their mother. Aristotle claimed that the women contributed with the 
material aspect of the foetus. Her menstrual blood was the unstructured, formless and passive 
matter (hylé) that the semen animated. In other words, man was the creator of life, while 
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woman provided the mute matter. The process may perhaps be likened to Michelangelo’s 
conception of the statue trapped inside the stone block, waiting for the artist/creator to release 
it and thus give it life. Just as it is the artist who turns the rock into art, man turns matter into 
human life. 
Aristotle believed that nature was governed by teleological principles. That is to say that each 
species strives towards a final and ultimate goal. The final goal of the human species was to 
create men. Man was the ultimate specimen of the human species. When nature produced a 
woman it strayed from its goal. But it did not miss the mark entirely. The upside to the mishap 
of the birth of a woman was the she was useful in the creation of more men. 
In ancient Greece Aristotle’s view was not shared by all – Leukippos, Demokritos and 
Hippokrates all meant that man and woman contributed equally to the foetus – but it was his 
theory that survived and informed later European thought on the subject. 
These two sources, the Bible and Aristotle, were employed by later centuries to 
authoritatively state that women were basically no more than defective men. 
 
The eighteenth century saw the emergence of a bourgeoisie with a new confidence. They had 
been strengthening their position by accumulating capital through trade and craftsmanship in 
the growing cities of Europe in the preceding centuries. A new paradigm of liberalism was 
created to suit their needs. Freedom and rationality would be the hallmark of this new 
philosophy, and man was its protagonist. At the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the 
nineteenth century a division between the public and private spheres developed. Men ruled 
unchallenged in the public sphere of commerce and government. Women were relegated to 
the private sphere, where the liberalistic ideals did not apply. Instead domesticity was 
informed by romantic ideals of emotions and sensitivity. The environment of the private home 
would serve as a tranquil haven of nurture and care, where the husband could retreat after a 
long day of strife and competition in the public sphere32. 
Parallel to the division of the public and private spheres, and the application of different sets 
of ideals to the two, men and women were to an increasing degree afforded different traits. 
Women were no longer mere incomplete and defective men; they had their own, separate 
nature. Men’s principal traits were rationality and morality. Women’s principal trait was 
emotionality, and she could not be expected to adhere to the high moral standards of men. 
Men had the intellect necessary to comprehend the intricate workings of society and nature, 
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and the strength to succeed in a competitive world. Women had the sensitivity that was 
needed to keep the family together. This was the time of privatisation of family life and the 
birth of the nuclear family33. 
The effect was that men and women increasingly inhabited different domains, so to speak, 
according to their (alleged) gender specific traits. 
The history of the emergence of the two-gender system illustrates that it is in fact precipitated 
by and founded on new societal and cultural paradigms at a certain point in time, and as such 
is no more universal than any other gender system. 
 
 Both the one- and the two-gender systems were based on male-female inequality.  
The one-gender system was based on a hierarchy of human worth, and as such unabashedly 
discriminating. The “fact” that women were inferior to men was freely admitted by (male) 
authorities. In the years between 1550 and 1700 women offered only sporadic opposition. 
Mostly their concern was for a change in male attitudes, not for equal rights. They entered 
into the debate on men’s premises, arguing for a new interpretation of the biblical texts and 
defending the moral standards of their sex. Although public attitudes may have changed 
during this period, women’s legal status did not. In 1700 women still could not go to 
university, the law afforded them no rights to equal job pay and conditions, married women 
depended on their husbands and they had no rights as to their children. Still marriage was one 
of the few “careers” open to them34. 
At the advent of modernity their situation started slowly to change. 1792 saw The Vindication 
of the Rights of Women by Mary Wollstonecraft, in which she rallied middle-class women to a 
raising of female consciousness and education. 
It is likely that the division into a public and a private sphere and the constitution of separate 
female gender qualities valuable to domesticity contributed to increasing the status of women. 
That is not to say that the system was one of equality. On the contrary, women were still seen 
as inferior in many respects, not suited to the most prominent positions in societal life. But on 
the whole the recognition of female distinctiveness and contribution to the community by way 
of their feminine traits marks a step up from the position of defective men. Women were now 
considered valuable members of society in their own right. 
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The nineteenth century in Britain saw the championing of legal rights for women in many 
areas. Among them were rights to personal property in marriage, custody of children, divorce 
and education. The struggles addressed the issues of women’s daily lives and often took the 
form of campaigns. New laws were passed. Progress was sluggish and often involved the 
readdressing of topics and subsequent bills. Some men joined in the struggle siding with 
women. Slowly their legal status improved. The end of the century saw the increasing demand 
for the vote and suffragette activism. There was a widened societal consciousness as to the 
situation of women35. 
At the turn of the century women had gone from the position of “defective men” to 
comprising a gender of their own, and they had raised their legal status in areas that affected 
their daily lives. 
After the First World War feminist issues were once again infrequently addressed, and it was 
only in the 1960s that the next surge in activism occurred. Despite the efforts and success of 
the fellow female combatants that had preceded them, it was still clear that society to a large 
extent was founded on injustice and inequality. The assignation of “feminine” qualities and 
the relegation of the female sex to the sphere of domesticity now were conceived as inhibiting 
the possibilities of women in society as a whole. In the USA the new struggle employed two 
strategies. On the one hand, Betty Friedan and the National Organisation for Women (founded 
in 1966) continued in the equal rights tradition, issuing a Bill of Rights for women in 1967. 
On the other hand, a more radical strain grew from the civil rights movement, the anti-war 
movement (opposing the war in Vietnam) and the student revolts. They felt that equal rights 
were not enough. Claiming that the system itself was oppressive and corrupt, they called for 
structural changes. They criticized the societal institutions – marriage, child rearing, sexual 
practices etc – calling for raised female consciousness. They focused on women as an 
oppressed social group and the female body as the site of that oppression. In both instances 
the need for autonomy was propagated. Writers such as Kate Millett and Shulamith Firestone 
offered theories on the workings of what they called an oppressive patriarchy, urging women 
to unite and resist the system. Patriarchal rule was ubiquitous, they claimed, and all women 
were its victims36. 
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In the turbulent 1970s of radicalism and calls for female solidarity and unity, Goldin spent her 
days with her transgendered crowd. They would go to The Other Side nightclub every night 
but Tuesday, partying and participating in beauty contests. Life was hard for her friends, she 
admits in the introduction to The Other Side: 
 
To survive, some of the queens collected welfare, some turned tricks, others sewed costumes 
for each other or sold antique clothes they found at thriftshops. There were no job 
opportunities in those days for people who lived in drag; they were even ostracized by most of 
the gay male community.37 
 
In the 1970s, in a parallel to women’s liberation, the gay rights movement gained momentum. 
The struggle evidently did not encompass transgender individuals. Goldin’s account does not 
only indicate that they were being left out, but that they were ostracized. Her friends did not 
fit in with the new political agenda. This was in fact also the case with the feminist groups. 
While they eventually sympathized with the cause of the gays, as one oppressed group 
towards another – realising that society’s repressive techniques were valid for both, gender-
crossers were left out. It was not until the 1980s and 1990s, with the advent of queer theory, 
that their gender expression was accepted on equal terms. 
The reservations of the women’s movement towards the transvestites and transsexuals are 
understandable. The movement depended on theories of patriarchy’s universal oppression of 
all women, and the solidarity and unity of patriarchy’s victims. In order for this model to 
work, they had to have a system with two distinct genders, where the one resisted the other. 
The two-gender system with its stringency and clarity suited their needs in this respect. The 
gender-crossers, on the other hand, confused the matter. It was not self-evident what gender 
they belonged to, and whether they were victims at all. The recognition of such an ambiguous 
gender category (or categories) threatened to blur the theoretical base of feminism and thwart 
the political struggle. 
There is a picture in The Other Side that to my mind eminently expresses the scepticism of 
women towards transgender people at this time. It is called Naomi in the audience (Boston, 
1973)38. It is a scene from The Other Side nightclub. One of Goldin’s acquaintances, Naomi, 
is seated among the audience, probably watching one of her friends perform in drag. She is 
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loudly cheering her on. What is interesting is to see the reaction of the rest of the spectators. 
Most of them are male, and almost all of them have their eyes fixed on the stage. Some of 
them express enthusiasm, and some show signs of what seems to be desire. They are 
immersed in the activity of looking at the spectacle, and they seem oblivious to Naomi and 
her cheering. All except one person. In the front row, two seats from Naomi in a dress with 
flowers, sits what appears to be a biological woman. She is not present in any of the other 
photographs and therefore is probably not part of Goldin’s entourage. I imagine she is there 
for the show. Unlike the men, she is not looking at the stage, but straight at Naomi. To me her 
expression is one of scepticism and disdain towards the “shouting man in the dress”. It is as 
though she is repressing an urge to cry out: “Who are you to wear that dress and pretend to be 
a woman!? You are not a real woman no matter what!”  
I love this photograph. It has so many layers.  
It may be seen as a battleground of two victim positions. Firstly, it is that of the biological 
woman, struggling hard and earnestly, willing to endure personal sacrifices and many 
disappointments, to lift herself out of oppression. And secondly, it is that of the “unspeakable” 
gender-crosser, who can call for support from no-one, expect no improvement, whose cause is 
lost even before the struggle has begun, and who is so destitute that she has given up the fight 
and just doesn’t care. The first embittered by resistance, but still aspiring to a position of 
respectability and equality in a society that she resents. Her resentment is now directed at the 
frivolous, carefree transgendered, thinking that she knows nothing of the burden of the harsh, 
theory-laden strife she herself has to endure, but still will be claiming the right to the fruit of 
her toils. The other, creating her world on the fringes of a system of which she could never, 
and would never, be a part.  
To me, this is thoroughly Foucauldian. Being gay, Foucault nevertheless resented the idea that 
he should “come out” and declare himself as such39. To him, all public self-declaration had a 
price, and that was the price of being caught in the web of prevailing discourse. In that web 
one inevitably takes on some of that discourse’s identity markers, to the limitation of one’s 
own freedom of original self-definition. In other words, at the moment you “confess”, you 
automatically take on the “sins” and “absolutions” of others. Foucault claimed that power 
does not only reside in authoritative institutions40. Power is everywhere. It is played out in 
every human relationship. It does not flow in only one direction, but in many. It is multiple 
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and pervasive. So you don’t have to belong to any of the great movements, such as the 
women’s movement or the gay movement, to wield power. On the contrary, to belong to one 
of these is to give up part of one’s personal power. To Foucault, every person is a power base 
of his or her own. From these diverse, polymorph power bases springs a plethora of original 
identity expressions in need of no further definition. To him, this was what subversive use of 
power meant. 
In the Goldin picture, Naomi, to me, represents such an original identity expression 
unhampered by current discourse. It would seem that the photographer agrees: 
 
This book is about new possibilities and transcendence. The people in these pictures are truly 
revolutionary; they are the real winners of the battle of the sexes because they have stepped 
out of the ring.41 
 
There is a sense of freedom in having a desire that has never been labeled.42 
 
New possibilities and freedom is what Foucault is talking about. 
Naomi and the others are not really rebels. In order to be a rebel you must actively oppose 
something. And inevitably be caught up in the discourse of that opposition. No, Goldin’s 
friends have instead “stepped out of the ring” and created a space apart. They do not rebel 
against or oppose anything. They just live their lives and don’t give a damn what other people 
think. I feel that this is a sound description of this environment at such an early stage in time. 
In opposition to this marginal and enigmatic identity is the biological woman. She has chosen 
to step into the ring, and to take on the fight within authoritative discourse. The price she has 
to pay is exactly that loss in self-definitional power that Foucault talks about. In addition to 
the hard counter-resistance she has met from reactionary forces, she also has had to subsume 
some of herself to the greater cause. She has gone from being one woman among many 
diverse women, to being a representative of the species “woman”. There has been an 
exchange of personal for common identity. She has made a sacrifice on the altar of political 
agency. Perhaps this is also present in her look at Naomi: bitterness brought on by loss of 
personal freedom and identity, and envy towards those that have retained it. 
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The outsider’s position of Naomi and her friends of course has its costs too. Many of the 
benefits of the greater society are beyond their reach. To the extent that they are noticed, they 
are the subject of ridicule and open hostility. But they have retained the power of personal 
self-definition. They may be abandoned and shut out, but at least they are free. 
Another way of interpreting this picture is to make an analysis of the gaze, as it is done in 
Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975)43, as a site of sadistic control 
and scopophilia. Mulvey claims that in narrative cinema female actors (and thus by 
identification the female sex) are subjected to (male) control and desire by way of the gaze of 
the spectators, the camera and the male actors. Goldin’s picture is ripe with gazes – that of 
Naomi, that of the male spectators, and that of the woman looking at Naomi. If the male 
audience’s gaze is one of control and scopophilic desire, then what about the woman’s gaze? 
It does probably not express desire, but perhaps control. Could her gaze be one that 
constitutes Naomi as “Other” to her, just as she herself is constituted as Other in the 
patriarchal economy?44 As she is ascending in the hierarchy, is she at the same time, by way 
of wilful exclusion or neglect, leaving people like Naomi behind to fill the void of the Other? 
The construction of groups of people as Other is a topic that I will revisit in the course of this 
dissertation (see for instance chapter 2.7). 
The woman’s look may also be considered by way of the Lacanian concept of jouissance.45 
This complicated concept may be seen as the site of a desire for something more than what 
can be offered by the Symbolic order46. It is also the site of loss, a feeling of once having 
possessed it. But the loss is a phatasmatic one, because that “something more” was never ours 
in the first place. In the Symbolic order, and especially in human relationships, we are always 
dissatisfied no matter how hard we strive, and we always have the feeling that there “should 
be more”. This is the realm of jouissance. We can imagine that the woman looks at Naomi 
and is reminded of her loss, of what she has sacrificed, and of the disappointing nature of her 
achievements. In contrast, she sees the exuberant and careless joy of the outsider47. 
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There is one more aspect in the lives of Goldin’s friends that I wish to include at this point. It 
is the one of fashion and glamour. Goldin writes: 
 
There was a wide range of gender identity among my friends. Several were pre-op 
transsexuals; others, like Ivy, never wanted to be women but were into the art of glamour, into 
fashion. 48 
 
My aspiration was to be a fashion photographer; my goal was to put the queens on the cover 
of Vogue. 49 
 
Fashion and the glamour of 1930s movies was an inspiration to Goldin. No doubt it coincided 
with the drag queens’ taste for flamboyant costumes and props. They were also into idolizing 
entertainment stars - singers and actresses - as is evidenced by multiple photographs in The 
Other Side. 
There is the picture Ivy with Marilyn (Boston, 1973)50. It portrays Ivy as a diva, wrapped in 
only a fur boa. Her head is thrown back, her lips slightly parted, eyelids heavy, wearing 
extensive make-up – including a beauty-spot – in a pose closely recalling that of actress 
Marilyn Monroe, an all-time favourite of the drag queen community. Monroe is also directly 
present, in the Andy Warhol print on the wall. 
Christmas at The Other Side (Boston, 1972)51 shows Ivy wearing a black dress, long silk 
gloves, pearl beads and a hat, reminiscent of Greta Garbo. She has just offered a light to the 
smoking male character in a painting, who has the air of a 1940s or 1950s male movie star. 
Smoking was considered a sign of sophistication back then. 
She appears again in Ivy in the Boston Garden (Boston, 1973)52 and Ivy in the Boston Garden: 
back (Boston, 1973)53, smoking, wearing a small hat with a veil, coat and skirt, fur boa, short 
gloves, stockings, and high heeled short boots, strolling through the park exuding nostalgic 
elegance. 
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No less elegant is Colette in Colette at home (Boston, 1974)54. We see her reflection in the 
ornamented dresser mirror, posing on her bed, naked but for a pair of string panties. She is 
surrounded by giant feather fans. Her impeccable make up is complemented by a necklace 
and a set of earrings. The whole picture has an air of timeless beauty and style, accentuated if 
anything by her nudity. Her languishing look into the mirror lends it a nostalgic tinge. 
These photographs bear witness to the fact that the taste for the glamorous in Goldin’s drag 
community had a wide array of expressions, ranging from the camp and over-the-top to the 
subtle. 
Still it may have made it even harder for the women’s movement to accept the drag queens as 
fellow victims and co-combatants. The idolizing of Hollywood movie stars and famous 
entertainment personas may have been interpreted as bowing to institutions that were 
perceived as taking part in the oppression of women. The camp and over-the-top expressions 
may have been considered to be mocking femininity, showing disrespect and a lack of serious 
devotion to the cause. To the extent that this was the case, I believe that this criticism was 
unfair and at least to a certain degree misdirected. The drag queen devotion to glamour is 
more than a simple imitation of the famous, or even of women. It contains strong elements of 
parody and irony, mixed with admiration, but it is not necessarily directed only at the female 
sex, or at the entertainment industry per se. I submit that it is an original, creative undertaking, 
transcending both stardom and womanhood, and that it should be considered on its own 
terms.  
Nevertheless, I do believe that when gender-crossers were finally accepted as part of the 
prevailing discourse and the Symbolic, their association with glamour and fashion played an 
important part in their positioning within it. 
 
 
2.3 Psychoanalysis and transgender identity. 
We have seen how female identity changed over the millennia from that of a defective and 
impotent variant of male perfection, through the acquisition of a separate but less important 
position, to being the agent of a call for a total revision of a corrupt system. We have seen the 
emphasis placed on the common fate of all women, and the necessity for unity and solidarity 
in order to gain political influence. 
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An important part of the feminist activism of the 1960s and 1970s was the compilation of 
comprehensive theories that could explain and underpin the claims of the movement. 
One of the theories that was appropriated, commented on and revised was psychoanalytic 
theory55. In it feminists found both a piece of authoritative patriarchal ideology and a point of 
departure for criticism. It was the part that dealt with sexual differentiation that was most 
interesting to them. Writers sought to show how Sigmund Freud’s theories on the Oedipus 
complex, the castration complex and the concept of penis envy were exemplary of the 
construction of the female as an inferior sex. 
As such the interrogation of psychoanalytic theory did not only critique male oppression. It 
also raised the question of what constitutes sex and gender. In this discussion the essentialists 
claimed that sex and gender are more or less innate or predestined – a result of biological 
influences that cannot be changed. This is known as essentialism. Against this view were the 
ones that saw gender as the result of what they called cultural constructions. They 
emphasized the importance of cultural and societal factors at play in constructing gender 
roles, and the importance of those roles in the experience and expression of gender. They 
insisted that those roles are amenable to individual and collective intervention56. Most 
feminists held a constructivist view. In the next chapter we shall see this view taken to its 
extreme when dealing with the theories of Judith Butler. 
 
In a way, Freud has one foot in both the one- and two-gender systems57. He claims that 
children of both sexes are basically the same psychologically up till the phallic phase (4 to 5 
years)58. Both have retained their activity, and they try to dominate and control their love 
object (their mother). It is in their further development in the phallic phase that females take 
on the role of “castrated males”, a reminiscence one might say, of the one-gender system. 
The boy’s development, according to Freud, is roughly as follows59: On entering the phallic 
stage, he directs his attention at his penis, and masturbates profusely. His father is the one 
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who issues a prohibition against this activity. He also notices that the love object, his mother, 
who he has tried sadistically to possess and dominate in the late anal stage, in fact directs her 
love towards his father. Noticing the female lack of a penis, he starts to contemplate the 
possibility of castration. He imagines that castration will be his father’s punishment for 
continued masturbation and wanting to possess and dominate his mother. Faced with this 
intolerable threat, the Oedipus complex is resolved when he gives in to the masturbation and 
incest prohibitions (he stops masturbating and stops competing for his mother’s love). Instead 
he now identifies with the father and with his phallic potency and power, which he believes to 
reside in his penis, and which he some day hopes to emulate. He represses his Oedipal urges. 
He turns his earlier sadism on himself by incorporating it into the super-ego along with the 
paternal prohibitions on masturbation and incest. He then enters the period of latency. During 
latency he learns, by the workings of the super-ego, to develop tender, loving, non-sexual 
feelings towards his mother and other people in general. On entering puberty, his repressed 
urges resurface, but he is now able to control them better. He directs them at a mother 
substitute, his future mate, and mixes them with sublimated tenderness. The result of this 
process is an individual with both the active agency (the Oedipal urges) and the morals (from 
the influence of the super-ego) intact. 
The girl, on the other hand, develops along a different and more tortuous path, one that Freud 
had trouble discerning and one that he revised during his career. On entering the phallic 
phase, she discovers the boy’s penis, and that she lacks it. Her conclusion is that she is already 
castrated. Having “lost” the most important organ of activity and agency, she realises that she 
cannot compete with her brother (and the masturbation symbolizing his agency). She gives up 
her clitoral masturbation. Instead of repressing her Oedipal urges, she abandons them 
altogether. At the same time she shifts from activity to passivity. Seeing that her mother also 
lacks the penis, she blames her for the loss. Her affection shifts to her father, hoping that he 
will give her a penis – the basis for the so-called penis envy. In time, her wish to be given a 
penis is substituted by the wish for a baby. Her Oedipal conflict is resolved by her shift from 
actively trying to acquire and dominate the love object, to passively waiting for the “gift” of a 
penis/baby. The sadism from the anal stage is not incorporated into a super-ego structure, but 
is, in accordance with her passive role, turned into masochism. Nor has she any masturbation 
prohibition to incorporate in the super-ego. On entering puberty, her masochistic wish for 
penetration and the gift of a penis/baby is directed at her future mate. The result of this 
development is a passive individual (abandoned Oedipal urges) relying on the agency of her 
male companion, and with a poorly developed moral (weak super-ego). 
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It is interesting to see how Freud’s model starts out with two sexes that are basically alike and 
equal psychologically, who – being faced with a biological difference (lack versus possession 
of penis – vestige of the one-gender system), become two fundamentally different genders 
each with their own specific set of traits (fully evolved two-gender system). Since the 
development is dependent on an organic body part, and since Freud thought that the Oedipus 
complex was universal – existing in all societies past and present – it is fair to say that his 
model of sexual differentiation is one of essentialism. 
 
Jacques Lacan in a way translated Freud’s model to fit society and culture as a whole60. 
Instead of Freud’s oral, anal, phallic and genital (in puberty) phases, he posited three “orders”. 
These are not really equivalent to intra-psychic, developmental phases in the Freudian sense. 
They are more like general human positions within the family, society, culture and the natural 
world. Freud took the individual mind as his starting point, and from there tried to work out 
how interpersonal as well as intra-psychic dynamics affected that mind. His scientific method 
was theorizing on discoveries he made analysing himself and patients. What he wanted to do 
was to map the human mind and its pathology. He considered himself a medical scientist first 
and foremost. The cultural implications of his findings he set forth later in his career, and they 
were clearly secondary to his medical formulations. 
Lacan, on the other hand, while taking Freud’s theories as a point of departure, had a much 
wider scope. He wanted to explain the fundamental premises of humanity as a whole. He 
considered the individual psyche not as an entity unto itself, but claimed that it could surface 
only in its multiple, interdependent, complex relations to its surroundings, be that familial, 
societal, cultural or natural, and that those surroundings were in turn also deeply 
interconnected. The vessel that allowed the subject to surface was, according to Lacan, 
language. Nature, on the other hand, served as a kind of perimeter to human existence. The 
fundamental premises of humanity were that of desire and lack, and society’s task was to deal 
with them. 
He stated that the infant’s development could be explained as two stages, or “orders”, the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic, and that each of them was in some way connected to an 
experience of lack.   
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The first, the Imaginary Order, is that of the pre-linguistic child61. In it the child lives in a 
close dyad with his mother. The body exists only as fragments; it is not connected to make up 
a whole. His perception of himself corresponds to the experience of his drives (hunger as a 
sensation in the stomach, need for emptying of the bowel as a sensation in the lower intestines 
etc), and to what he can observe of his body from his limited vantage point. Between the ages 
of 6 to 18 months he enters the so-called Mirror Stage62. In it he detects his own reflection in 
the mirror, and slowly starts to identify with it. In time he accepts it as a proper representation 
of himself. The problem with this, according to Lacan, is that the mirror image is not a real, 
but an imaginary self-representation. The image holds an autonomy and wholeness that the 
real child does not. So when the child constructs his ego around it, he in fact grants his ego an 
autonomy and wholeness that was never there. His ego is a conceit. It is this split between the 
ego structure as a site of autonomy and wholeness and a reality that contradicts it that 
represents the first lack. 
The second lack is the child’s loss of his mother’s love on resolving the Oedipal complex, and 
the substitution of this love by the entering into language and the Symbolic Order63. The 
Lacanian version of the overcoming of the complex differs from the Freudian one. It is not the 
father’s penis as a bodily organ that the little boy identifies with on giving up his mother as a 
love object. It is the Phallus64. The Phallus is the bodily penis, but it is also, and more 
importantly, a site of phantasmatic plenitude and mastery. In this respect it is the equivalent to 
the mirror image in the Imaginary Order. Believing the father to have that Phallus, the boy 
follows him into the realm of language and the Symbolic Order, the purported site of the 
Phallus. The child accomplishes this by subjecting to the Law of the Father - the incest 
prohibition. One might say that in the Symbolic Order the boy hopes to find the sense of 
autonomy and wholeness that he has lost, and the love that he has forsaken. Once again the 
problem is that the Phallus, just like the reflection in the mirror, does not, and did never, really 
exist. There is not and there never was a total autonomy and wholeness, just as there is no 
immaculate mother’s love. 
The experience of the two lacks is what informs the Lacanian version of desire. Desire is the 
act of trying to rectify them; to mend what has been severed, to find what has been lost. 
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Desire is the act of hunting for ghosts. Lacan’s concept of desire resurfaced throughout his 
career under different names, such as the objet petit a and jouissance65. It is also connected to 
the third Lacanian order, the Real66. The Real is a category that I will come back to later in 
this dissertation (chapter 2.8).  
Inevitably finding that he does not possess the Phallus, the subject will construct a 
phantasmatic Other, a site where he believes it to reside. The Other becomes the object of his 
desire. This has bearing on Lacan’s thoughts on gender differences67. On subjecting to the 
Law of the Father, and entering language and the Symbolic, the boy identifies with his 
father’s role as the one who has the Phallus. The little girl, on the other hand, has no Phallus. 
She is constructed within this order as the one being the Phallus, i.e. the object of male desire. 
She is the Other that holds the promise of (phantasmatic) wholeness and love. As with Freud, 
this would seem to be an essentialistic gender conception. But there is one crucial difference 
between the two. Whereas Freud’s hallmark of gender difference, the penis, is a concrete, 
biological, inevitable entity, the Phallus in Lacanian theory is a fiction. The Phallus is not a 
bodily organ, it is a symbol of something that does not exist, and it is only loosely connected 
to the penis. Therefore, no-one can really be said to have or be the Phallus. Furthermore, since 
the Phallus is a purely symbolic entity, a signifier, it may be appropriated and reassigned to 
new meanings. This point was not lost on feminist writers. 
 
Having reviewed the Freudian and Lacanian theories on gender differentiation, I now return 
to two Goldin photographs. I want to try to hold Roommate in her chair68 and Colette at 
home69 up against these theories in order to understand why the transgender people were shut 
out of the 1960s and 1970s women’s movement. 
As I have said earlier, feminist writers appropriated psychoanalytic theory - and with it the 
two-gender system - to show the workings of the patriarchy. Though they opposed the 
discrimination of the female sex, they did not reject the theory altogether. It would seem that 
they accepted, and still accepts, crucial aspects of it. In fact, quite a number of writers used it 
as the theoretical basis from which they set forth their critique of patriarchy. I find this 
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puzzling. One would think that utter and complete rejection would be the appropriate feminist 
response to an evidently sexist theory. After all, psychoanalysis is not an established scientific 
fact. It is a theory. Nothing more. It seems to me that taking it as a starting point – “colluding” 
with the enemy so to speak – would inevitably corrupt the theorizing process from the start. 
 
People like roommate and Colette not only threatened to fragment the unity of women, thus 
curtailing their political agency. The writers may also have been worried that accepting them 
would tear down their theoretical hold over the movement. 
Whatever the reason may be for the rejection by the women’s movement, it is clear that 
roommate and Colette is incompatible with both the two-gender system and Freudian 
psychoanalysis.  
In chapter 2.1 I discussed the relation to the former. Their existence is equally disruptive to 
psychoanalytic theory of gender differentiation. Freud claimed that the penis was the organ of 
primacy. It was the penis itself that started the cascade that eventually turned boys into men 
and girls into women. It was on recognizing her loss of the penis that the girl abandoned 
Oedipal urges altogether, subjecting to a life in passivity and penis envy. The thought that 
someone willingly would want to cut off that most noble of body parts must seem 
preposterous. Besides, the fact that someone could possess a penis and still feel like a woman 
would compromise the position of the penis as the prime agent of gender differentiation. 
According to psychoanalytic theory, gender resides in the penis (or lack of it in girls), not in 
the brain or in any other body part. If someone is born with a penis, he becomes a man, simple 
as that. 
As far as I know, Freud never observed or treated transgender people, and I have found no 
description of them in the literature pertaining to him. There existed expertise on transgender 
phenomena in the first half of the twentieth century, in Berlin, in the circle of Magnus 
Hirschfeld. But the knowledge probably did not seep through to conservative Vienna. 
But we know that Freud was quite liberal in his view on homosexuality70. He did not 
subscribe to the notion that held some merit at the time, that homosexual men were biological 
males with female brains. His view was that they were males like all other males. Furthermore 
he stated that they were neither subject to neurological degeneration (another widely held 
belief about homosexual men), nor suffering from any serious psychological illness. In this 
respect he was influenced by his admiration for famous artists through history that were 
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known to having been gay. He deduced that men of such faculties could hardly have suffered 
from neurological damage or psychological distress. Freud’s position was that homosexuality 
could be explained by his model of gender differentiation. Gay men were simply men that had 
chosen a male love object. Their evolution was a variant of the mainstream one. By analogy it 
is therefore likely that he, had he theorized on transgenderism, would have offered an 
explanation consistent with his psychological theories founded on the Oedipus complex, the 
primacy of the penis, castration anxiety, and choice of love object. I am not sure, however, 
that he would have afforded them the normalcy that he bestowed upon the homosexual male. I 
doubt it. 
 
The women’s movement contested the primacy of the penis and claimed that penis envy was a 
fabrication. They maintained that up till that point in time, psychoanalysis had been part of the 
oppressive arsenal of patriarchy. It was part of a system that brutally oppressed all women. A 
system that all women wanted to overthrow. As I said before, several writers took 
psychoanalysis as a starting point for their critique. So they were in a way dependent on its 
power and influence. Without it their critique would be inconsequential. To them, gender 
differentiation power had indeed resided in the penis. Not because it was inevitable or natural, 
but as an effect of patriarchal law. Psychoanalysis was an example of the materialization of 
this law. To claim, as male gender-crossers do, that the female position is the desirable one, 
would be to undermine the patriarchal power of the penis and to willingly seek refuge in a 
discriminated state. It would be to contest the system’s power of oppression, and at the same 
time lessen the burden of that oppression by expressing a will to take up a position subjected 
to it. 
  
Furthermore, the fact that people like roommate and Colette claim to be women in spite of 
being born in male bodies weakens the movement’s definitional power of the term “woman”. 
Who could decide who or what is a woman? What is the criterion of womanhood? The 
thought of allowing each individual to answer this crucial question, no matter their biological 
status at birth, must have seemed impossible. In a way the feminist theorists, just like the 
psychoanalytic ones, depended on the penis as gender discriminator. 
 
So, in the effort to keep theory comprehensive and unequivocal the transgender people were 
left to fend for themselves as best they could. They simply did not fit into the picture. 
 37 
But Colette and roommate would undoubtedly fare better within Lacanian gender analysis. As 
I stated earlier, the Phallus – the gender discriminator – is an unstable entity. Not only is it 
detached from all bodily organs. It is also non-existent within culture as a whole. It does not 
really reside anywhere. It is a mere phantasmatic symbol of plenitude and wholeness 
constructed to alleviate and rectify the experiences of lack – the basic human condition. Since 
it is a signifier, it may be appropriated and re-assigned. Anyone can wield its power. 
Since the Phallus, and not the penis, is the site of agency, the configuration of the individual’s 
body parts is no longer of crucial importance. Lacan stated that women can also assume the 
position of having the Phallus. In fact, they can actually shift back and forth between the 
positions of having and being the Phallus. Men seem to have more restricted options; they 
have to choose one of the two and stick to it.  
Lacan also claimed that women have a surplus of jouissance – the object of desire71. Since 
they are not subjected to the Law of the Father and the Symbolic to the same degree as men, 
they are not in the same way caught up in the false promises of the order. Therefore, as kind 
of “free agents” in the system, they have access to sources of jouissance that are closed to 
men. 
Now it follows that in the Lacanian gender differentiation model, transgender people are in 
command of the Phallus. Their position within the Symbolic order is not obvious, but it is 
likely that they, same as women, are not as caught up in it as men are. That would mean that 
they too have the opportunity to choose their position in relation to the Phallus, and that they 
too have access to some of that mysterious surplus jouissance. 
 
 
2.4 Queer theory and transgender identity. 
The structuralist scrutiny of “grand narratives” and public institutions had the effect of 
revealing their contingency. In the 1980s and 1990s, no longer being conceived of as 
instigated by “nature” or any supra-human authority, they were subjected to critique and 
deconstruction. Their inner workings of power were analysed and questioned. One by one, the 
once-eternal truths and beliefs started to crumble. One by one, the narratives and institutions 
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slowly changed. It was the dawn of the pragmatic and eclectic age of post-structuralism, post-
modernism, and – some say – post-feminism72. 
One of the “grand narratives” under attack was that of the two-gender system. As I stated in 
chapter 2.1 it was so pervasive and was sustained by such subtle mechanisms that it had the 
appearance of being completely natural and self-evident. But as a result of the critique of the 
1980s and 1990s that started to change, albeit sluggishly. 
The starting point for the resistance to the two-gender system was twofold, I think. Firstly, 
there were the great “liberation movements” of the 1960s and 1970s; of women, of people of 
colour, of homosexual people. They showed that the “truths” underpinning discriminatory 
practices were based on false assumptions, and that activism was an effective tool in order to 
obtain change. The movements started a chain reaction. Given their success, more and more 
people who felt that they were in one way or other victims to the prevailing system would 
follow in their trail. “Liberation” and the coming into light of “minority” groups were the 
trends of the day. Secondly, and rather paradoxically, the women’s movement also afforded a 
starting point for the critique of the two-gender system not by its success, but by its 
shortcomings. As noted in the preceding chapter, the movement built its theories on precisely 
the two-gender system, championing the theories’ universal validity for all women. Unity was 
paramount, and internal differences in the movement were downplayed. Still it encountered 
increasing opposition from women who did not feel that their situation was properly 
addressed and represented. Women of colour and lesbians, for instance, did not feel at home 
in the theoretical deliberations of an all-white, heterosexual, middle class intellectual elite. 
Consequently they did not necessarily feel solidarity towards those strata of the female 
population. The experience of being inadequately represented by feminist theory made them 
question not only the validity of the theory, but also started a debate on the term “woman” 
itself. Questioning the unity and “wholeness” (to use a term with a Lacanian tinge) of 
“woman” led to the partial fragmentation of the movement, and from some of the fragments 
sprung the so-called queer theory73. 
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The queer phenomenon is not really a uniform movement74. It is rather a multi-focal and 
polymorph practice of theorizing and critique. Whereas the women’s movement sought unity 
and cohesion, the queer activists embraced diversity. Inspired by Michel Foucault and his 
theories on the discursive construction of sex and gender – he stated that none of them are 
“natural” or self-evident entities, but culturally and socially constructed ones75, and the 
Derridean concept of linguistic differance – claiming that signification depends on what is 
absent76, they set out to deconstruct the dichotomies (binary oppositions)77 
heterosexual/homosexual and male/female. Thus sexual orientation, gender identity and 
gender systems were no longer considered to be innate or self-evident entities. They were 
deemed cultural constructions intimately dependent on the workings of the society in which 
they were validated. Given their nature as constructions they furthermore were not universal. 
They differed from one society to another, and through the span of history. In this context the 
“woman” that the feminists called to opposition, was no more than a crude discursive and 
linguistic category, and could not be representative of all the diverse individuals of the female 
sex. Consequently no theory could claim to speak on behalf of all women, just as no theory 
could speak on behalf of all homosexuals, lesbians and people of colour. 
 
Judith Butler is the queer theorist par excellence78. Her writings on sexed and gendered 
identity have been very influential. In them she seeks to explain the instability and 
indeterminacy of all such identity categories. 
To Butler, sex and gender are cultural constructions. Their means of construction is language. 
Furthermore she states that sex and gender are performative. Performativity is the repeated 
expression of the identities that are possible in a specific society79. It differs from the term 
“performance” in the sense that in performativity the deed precedes the “doer”, not the other 
way around. She uses the Althussian concept of interpellation – the naming performed and 
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reiterated by authorities to bestow a particular identity upon their subjects80, and shows how 
sex and gender is bestowed upon a person through authoritative utterances from that first 
statement by the obstetrician: “It’s a girl!” Through interpellation and the repeated acts of 
expressing one’s gender - processes that run right through the entire lifespan of an individual - 
identities are formed that are in accordance with the prevailing discourse and the law of 
prohibition in that specific society. 
Butler claims that it makes no sense to speak of organic or bodily sex as an independent 
entity, since all sexed and gendered identity is created through language and discourse. We 
cannot speak of those entities except by using concepts that are always already embedded in 
and governed by prevailing discourse. She argues that the language that purports to describe 
bodies and genders actually constitutes them. In fact, sex and gender are the effects, rather 
than the causes of language and discourse. To her then, the discussion of whether sex and 
gender are essential or constructed is a futile one, since essentialism does not really exist. 
Butler’s concept of performative gender also means that there is no innate or “original” 
subject that acts. The subject is no more than an effect of patterns laid down in society, and it 
is destined to repeat those patterns and in so doing cementing them even more. There is no 
“doer” behind the deed. And there is no such thing as free will81. 
In a given society there are some identity possibilities that are endorsed and cultivated, and 
others that are prohibited. According to Butler, in the Western modern civilization these 
processes follow the law of what she calls “compulsory heterosexuality”82. That is to say that 
the system fosters heterosexual men and women and frowns upon other identity options. 
Following Derridean language theory she states that the endorsed identities nonetheless 
contain and depend upon the counterparts that they prohibit. Thus heterosexuality, for 
instance, depend upon homosexuality for its demarcation and self-definition. In a feat of 
subversive theorizing, Butler thus places the means of subversion within the system itself. 
As I mentioned the concept of agency is a complicated one in Butler’s writings. On the one 
hand, she claims that all sex and gender issues are the result of language, prevailing discourse 
and the law, and that nothing can exist outside them. Even the subject is such a “prisoner”, as 
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we have seen. The subject accordingly is no “free agent”. This would seem to curtail any 
attempts at instigating changes. On the other hand, she claims that the system itself offers up 
the possibilities for subversive action. Since the act of interpellation and performativity are 
ongoing processes that never end, they are also open-ended ones with no possibility for 
closure. This means that identity is never final or fixed. It is always subject to change. She 
quotes de Beauvoir in that one is not born, but rather one becomes a woman. So to Butler 
also, the concept of “woman” is very much a term-in-progress. Since identity is never stable, 
and since the system cannot help but to produce the very identity options that it seeks to 
prohibit, the subject can appropriate and don any of these. She speaks of the range of possible 
identity entities as garments in a wardrobe: the number of garments is determined in advance, 
but from these one can choose whichever one wants. The system may try to make you put on 
one or the other. Still the subject can resist the system’s call. In this she departs from 
Althusser, as she states that interpellation is not always effective – it sometimes misses its 
mark, and in her Foucauldian model power is non-situated, pervasive, multiple and 
productive. In other words, the system is not infallible. So it would seem that Butler sees 
agency on the one hand as something that is confined to and “trapped” within the discursive 
system, but on the other hand as something retaining a certain degree of potency. 
Butler offers extensive critique of the law of “compulsory heterosexuality”. She claims that 
heterosexuality is a “melancholic” structure83. Melancholy, according to Freud, is the reaction 
to a loss that cannot be grieved84. The reason for the inability to grieve is that the bereaved has 
ambivalent feelings towards the lost object, feelings that he or she cannot admit to having. 
Unable to mourn, the person incorporates the lost object and makes it part of its ego structure, 
giving it a melancholic aspect. Now, in a radical reworking of Freud, Butler claims that what 
she calls the taboo against homosexuality precedes the incest taboo. Through it the child is 
prohibited from mourning the loss of the love of the same-sex parent. Still the loss of the love 
of the same-sex parent is incorporated into the ego structure and kept there as a hidden and 
unrecognised “homosexuality”. Thus heterosexual identity and desire is founded upon the 
prohibition of homosexual desire - a desire that is in fact incorporated into the ego structure as 
a melancholic entity. The greater the prohibitive force, the deeper the repression of 
homosexual desire, and the greater the urge to compensate through what Butler calls 
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“hyperbolic heterosexuality” and homophobia. Thus it would seem that heterosexuality, far 
from being “compulsory”, is indeed a defect of some kind. 
Resistance and subversion are key concepts in Butler’s theories. We have seen that the 
subject, although no more than an effect of discourse and the law, still retains some agency. 
Through prohibition the system as well as the heterosexual individual is dependent on 
alternative identity formations. Since the system uses language as its means of interpellation 
and prohibition, its concepts are – in accordance with modern language theory – open to 
appropriation and re-signification. As an example Butler appropriates the Lacanian Phallus. 
She asserts that since it has no strict relation to any specific body part, and is in fact a mere 
signifier, it can be made to re-signify any body part or any vessel of power. The Phallus is a 
“plastic” signifier. She consequently introduces the lesbian Phallus85. 
Drawing on the failure of the interpellative call of the law, she suggests ways to visualize the 
constructed and unstable workings of sex and gender identity formation. The best way to do 
this, she says, is through parodic proliferation of gender expressions. Parody is a way of 
showing alternative identity expressions that are deemed by society not to matter, and at the 
same time to expose the impotence of the system. Drag, to Butler, can be such a parodic, 
subversive practice86. Drag, she claims, is an allegory of heterosexual melancholy. 
Nevertheless, she asserts that there are both “good” and “bad” gender citations, and that the 
bad ones only contribute to enforcing existing heterosexual norms. 
Dealing with the issue of hate speech, she returns to her agency-restricted subject, claiming 
that there is no culpable subject87. The law, she says, in fact produces the culpable subject in 
order to prosecute it. Her alternative is again not one of prohibition, but of appropriation and 
parodic re-signification of hate speech terms, with potentially unexpected subversive results. 
Thus parodic proliferation and drag are examples of Butler’s strategy choices when faced with 
restricting discourse and prohibitive law. Mis-recognition of the naming by authorities is 
another and parallel strategy. 
Accepting Butler’s theories and activist strategies means that we must give up all our claims 
to coherence of self-identity and at the same time accept the Otherness within ourselves. This 
is a point worth noting, since I will try to show what effects such ideas may have had for the 
transgender community.  
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Butler’s most influential books on sex and gender theory were published in 1990 (Gender 
Trouble) and 1993 (Bodies That Matter). They are pillars in the field of queer theory, and 
contributed to a greater acceptance of diverse gender expressions. The newly found increase 
in self-worth can also be seen in Goldin’s book, I think.  
In the introduction to The Other Side she tells us how she lost contact with her trans-gendered 
friends when she started going to art school full time in the seventies. Then in 1978 she 
moved to New York City. In the 1980s two of her closest friends were transsexuals. One of 
them was a top model in Paris – perhaps an omen of the status change in progress. 
The only pictures in The Other Side from the 1980s are the ones of Greer, a close friend of 
Goldin’s. To my mind they stand apart from the other photographs in the book. In their 
portrayal of squalid circumstances they more closely resemble the images in The Ballad of 
Sexual Dependency, which Goldin was working on at the time88. 
Then, in 1990, she met a whole new crowd of drag queens in New York. Once again she 
embarked on an extensive photographic odyssey with enthusiasm. But things had changed. 
Compared to the queens she was now the older one. And, as she writes: 
 
The social setting has also changed – they are not as marginalized as they were in the mid 
‘70s, but are more incorporated into and appreciated by the gay community. Many have jobs 
– in bars and clubs, as make-up artists and hairdressers; some are models in Vogue.89 
 
The change in social setting is probably, at least in part, due to the watershed academic 
activity mentioned earlier in this chapter, in which post-structuralist and queer theory began 
to deconstruct old truths and the two-gender system in particular. 
This academic influence is also evident in the pictures, I feel. Joey on my bed on the back 
cover of The Other Side is an example. It is taken in New York in 1991. It shows Joey 
reclining on a bed, with long, flowing hair and make up. She is wearing nothing but panties, a 
brassiere and a fishnet body. A big tattoo is visible on her left upper arm. Her right hand is 
placed behind her head, and her left covers her pubic area. She looks straight at the 
photographer. 
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This, once again, is a wonderfully complex image. 
Joey’s reclining pose closely resembles that of a Titian Venus. The positioning of her left 
hand does the same. This so-called pudica gesture (holding the hand close to the pubis area) 
goes all the way back to Praxiteles’ Aphrodite of Knidos (approx. 350-340 BC), the first 
completely nude full figure female statue in Greek art. It is possible that the gesture originated 
from images of Aphrodite-Astarte of Cyprus. In these images the pudica gesture does not 
denote bashfulness, but Aphrodite-Astarte’s status as goddess of fertility90. So the positioning 
of the left hand in Goldin’s picture may actually be a way to accentuate Joey’s fertility. 
Seeing that Joey cannot have any children as a woman, the gesture is an example of subtle 
parody. Through the appropriation of the pudica gesture it plays on the ultimate female 
activity of childbearing. 
The whole photograph, as well as the pudica gesture, also plays on sexuality in a more 
general way. After all, Aphrodite/Venus was the goddess of love. But the unabashed eroticism 
of Joey is distinctly more modern than a Praxiteles or a Titian. It brings to mind the Venus-
pastiche of Manet’s Olympia (1863). Both Goldin and Manet deal with “forbidden” sexuality. 
But whereas Manet in Olympia’s sad face shows us the costs of this sexuality - and points an 
accusing finger at the ones responsible for those costs (the male, bourgeois spectator), all such 
hints of tragedy are gone from the Goldin picture. Joey flaunts her body unabashedly; her lips 
parted; her cheeks flushed. There is no sadness in her eyes, but rather a hint of a smile, both 
inviting and ironic. The shame of the forbidden love is shed. 
The Joey picture, like the Olympia one, involves the spectator in their themes through the way 
both protagonists look directly at the viewer. In the Manet painting, the spectator is obliged to 
consider the ethical and moral consequences of prostitution, and the double standards of the 
day. In this way it is a painting with a “pedagogic” intent. Goldin’s photograph, on the other 
hand, goes beyond ethic and moral issues, and invites the viewer to reflect upon a much more 
basic concept, namely that of desire itself. Seeing that the protagonist most likely is an 
individual of contrasting gender and biological sex, the very nature of desire and sexuality is 
being interrogated. It is as if though Joey looks at us, asking: “What is it that you desire? Is it 
me, the transgender person named Joey? Or is it a mere fantasy?” What is the real nature and 
object of (male) desire? 
In chapter 2.1 I asked which elements that make up the femininity of the person designated as 
“roommate”. In this Joey picture Goldin goes one step further, destabilizing not only the 
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gender stereotypes, but also the foundations of sexuality itself. This time the Mulveyian male 
gaze not only misses its mark, as in Goldin’s pictures from the 1970s. It is taken up and 
played back and forth between the spectator and the protagonist like a ping-pong ball, never 
settling down. This feels like a playful game. It is quite typical of the 1990s that Goldin 
applies irony and parody as its tools. One may say that this is a thoroughly post-modern work, 
appropriating and playing with sexual, gender and artistic conventions. It is a picture that 
resonates with Butlerian ideas. 
Due to the academic and activist recognition of transgender identity from the 1980s onwards, 
Goldin’s friends were now, as she asserts, brought from the obscurity of their earlier existence 
and into the light of public interest as part of the gay rights’ movement. The movement 
organized the annual Gay Pride Parades. They afforded a vehicle for political activism, an 
opportunity for self-promotion and a chance to celebrate. Goldin’s photograph Misty and 
Jimmy Paulette in a taxi (taken in New York City, 1991)91 shows two of her friends on their 
way to the parade.  
Both wear heavy make up. Misty has a bright blue wig on, heavy heart-shaped earrings, and a 
metallic blue, sleeveless dress. Both the wig and the dress are clearly made of synthetic fibres. 
Jimmy Paulette has an equally synthetic blond wig, a short, white fishnet top with sleeves, 
and a metallic gold push-up brassiere. They sit in the back seat of a taxi, looking straight into 
the camera. 
Again, as in the Joey picture, the emphasis here is on the parodic. Neither Misty nor Jimmy 
even pretends to mimic any kind of traditional femininity. Their whole attire underpins that 
impression: The metallic hues and colours of wigs, dress and brassiere are altogether 
“unnatural”. The make-up is more fitting for the theatrical scene than for the real world. 
Jimmy’s fishnet top is torn asunder. The straps of her brassiere have gone down her upper 
arms. The brassiere looks as if it was never meant to fit in the first place. Tellingly, a piece of 
white fabric is visible in one of the cups, flaunting the artificiality of Jimmy’s breasts for all to 
see. Indeed, one gets the feeling that their outfits are a parody, no longer on femininity, but on 
drag itself. A parody on the parody on gender; a mimesis three times removed. 
Misty and Jimmy Paulette are ready for the big parade. But I cannot help but wonder what 
rights they will be fighting for there, what ways of living they will proudly promote. Perhaps 
their eyes tell it all. Under heavy eyelids they gaze vacantly at the camera, with expressions 
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that do not speak of desire, but rather of fatigue and emptiness. Theirs are not the Joey look of 
playful, ironic and open-ended sexuality. 
 
 
2.5 Comparing photographs. 
I now want to compare the pictures from the 1970s with those taken after 1980. I want to look 
for further clues as to the disintegration of identity I have discussed so far. 
 
One obvious difference is that while the early photographs are in black-and-white, the latter 
are all in colour. 
Originally, black-and-white was preferred for “Art photography” by artists and critics. The 
argument was that it set the works apart from everyday life and thus elevated them to the 
realm of Art – perhaps somewhat like the grisaille of a Carracci painting denotes beings of a 
“higher” level. Accordingly, colour photography was deemed “too realistic”, too close to life 
to be art92. This of course changed with artists like Eggleston and others. 
Curiously though, Goldin’s colour photography does not necessarily look more “realistic” 
than her black-and-white ones. In her production as a whole, her colour palette spans the 
entire spectrum – from bright, saturated hues to subdued nuances of browns, blues and greys. 
The colour pictures in The Other Side tend to be of the saturated kind. Mostly they contain 
one or more object of bright colour, and the indoor ones – especially the ones taken without a 
flash – are suffused with the golden glow of the lamplight. These colours are the ones we 
would expect to find in a fashion magazine – indeed the artist was inspired by fashion 
photography – and they give the same sense of removal from everyday reality as does fashion 
photography. They look like they have been taken in a magical land, in a fairy tale of sorts, 
where everything is glamorous and shiny. In Goldin’s pictures it is Saturday night all week 
long, and the party goes on forever. These are not the hues of an ordinary, dreary Monday 
afternoon under a pale sky. 
One may argue that Goldin’s use of colour in The Other Side concurs with the post-modern 
fragmentation of identity. The colours effectively underscore the “unreal” quality of her 
protagonists and the world they live in. This “unreality” is nothing like the classical, timeless 
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aloofness of High Art. Rather it seems a symptom of our glaring, hyperbolic age, that, 
although having lost touch with real life, is all too mundane. 
 
Another factor to compare is the composition of the pictures. Goldin employs different kinds 
of composition. Sometimes she is strictly formal, especially in portraits, with the subject 
placed along the middle line or the golden section, and with the picture components carefully 
balanced. At other times she composes her photographs according to what has been called the 
“snapshot aesthetic”93. A “snapshot” is originally a photograph taken in a hurry to catch a 
transient scene on film. The picture components often look as if though they are distributed 
randomly within the picture space. Some are even at the edges of it and may be cut off by the 
frame in an evidently arbitrary manner. The resulting impression is frequently one of chaos 
and disarray. 
The formal composition type is of course associated with High Art, and the “snapshot 
aesthetic” connotes the amateur photographer and a more straightforward link between the 
picture and everyday life. The latter is thought of as being more “realistic”. Though having 
connotations of amateur photography the “snapshot aesthetic” has been appropriated by 
professional artists in order to convey such a sense of realism. 
Goldin quite often uses the “snapshot” compositional device. It is part of her trademark, so to 
speak. Even though it occurs in both the black-and-white and the colour photographs, it seems 
to me to be employed more frequently in the latter ones. And again, as with the colours, I am 
not satisfied that it denotes reality per se. It denotes one particular kind of reality; the 
haphazard kind – chaos instead of order. To me this is the most important point here. As with 
the use of colours, I feel that Goldin’s choice of this particular compositional technique 
underscores the fragmentation of the identity of her subjects. 
 
Another technical device of Goldin’s is the application of “blur” to the pictures94. That is to 
say that the whole or a part of the picture is out of focus and thus indistinct. 
The blur occurs in both the 1970s photographs and the post 1980 photographs. But it seems to 
me that the blur of the former is of a different nature than the blur of the latter. 
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In the 1970s black-and-white pictures, as I mentioned in regard to the Roommate in the 
kitchen, the blur is a uniform fuzziness that fills the entire picture plane (see chapter 2.1). It 
may be the result of usage of fast film. As I have said it reminds me of Pictorialist 
photographs, with all their connotations of High Art. It signals aloofness and timelessness. 
In the later pictures, on the other hand, Goldin uses the blur to create a sense of movement. 
This is probably done by photographing a subject in motion, or by moving the camera with 
“too slow” shutter speed. The result here is not one of aloofness, but one of hectic 
restlessness. It is as if her subjects are so restless that they are literally falling apart. 
To put it in a quasi-Neoplatonic way, the black-and-white blur connote exaltation and 
transcendence while the colour blur connote disintegration and immanence – a return to mute 
matter. Thus the use of the blur in the colour photographs may once again be interpreted to 
illustrate the fragmentation of identity, this time involving not only the mind, but the body as 
well. 
 
There is one more subject that deserves to be mentioned when we compare the older and the 
more recent photographs of The Other Side. It is what I would like to call the narrative 
content of the pictures. 
A narrative is generally understood as a kind of story. In visual art it is the story that the 
image “tells” us. In a picture the artist may install certain visual clues, clues that are familiar 
to the spectator, in order to get the correct meaning – the story of the image – across to the 
spectator. Biblical pictures are exemplary. For instance, the visual clues of a ship, a man being 
thrown overboard, and a whale, will for a Christian tell the story of Jonah and the whale, with 
all its connotations of death and resurrection. Visual narratives depend on the spectators being 
familiar with their “language” – that is, the correspondence between particular visual elements 
and the underlying story that is to be told. A visual narrative is a kind of a re-telling of a story, 
a recognition and a reminder. It may also be creative by combining visual elements from 
different stories. 
An artist can turn any picture more narrative by including such elements. Such elements will 
“rub off” on the other (non-narrative) elements so that they are interpreted in the same 
manner, or context. The non-narrative elements will thus be imbued with the same qualities 
that are afforded the narrative ones. Advertising photography, for instance, uses this device all 
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the time, trying to install upon their products new meanings that are in no way inherent to 
them95. 
It is interesting to see that Goldin uses such narrative techniques in her black-and-white 
pictures. For instance, in the Roomate in the kitchen, there is the image of the girl on the wall 
(see chapter 2.1). Even though it is fuzzy, we seem to have seen images like that before. It is 
sentimental, and connotes, among other things, innocence, girlish sensitivity and a happy 
childhood. And it is precisely in our recognition of its narrative meaning and connotations that 
it works, imbuing the roommate with the same characteristics. The effect of the image of the 
little girl is to tell us that the roommate too was once an innocent and sensitive girl. In this 
way, Goldin tries to resolve our uncertainty regarding the identity of the roommate, insisting 
that she is as female as the little girl, and to make us more sympathetic and understanding 
towards her. It is cleverly done. 
We also remember the Roommate in her chair photo (see chapter 2.1). The visual clues are 
subtler here, but they are present all the same. The cloth on the wall connotes domesticity. 
The summer dress connotes innocence (again) and femininity. The latter is also connoted by 
the position of the slightly flexed right hand. All these, and more, are visual clues, familiar to 
us, dense with meaning, applied in order to make sure we get the “correct” story. 
In Colette at home the subtle connotations are that of old film divas – the fan of ostrich 
feathers, the lavish jewellery, the heavy make up, even the semi-recumbent pose and the 
languishing look into the mirror (see chapter 2.2). Not quite so subtle is Ivy with Marilyn, but 
the Warhol poster portraying the film goddess, and Ivy’s pose, imitating her, are all put there 
so that we shall make that connection in our mind - between her and the famous female 
actress (see chapter 2.2). The picture tells us that Ivy is not only a woman, but she is the 
woman of every man’s dream. And she is a star in her own right. The narrative here is one of 
femininity and glamour. 
Glamour and femininity is also the theme of Christmas at The Other Side (see chapter 2.2). 
The image of the man makes one think of romantic Hollywood heroes of old. Ivy offering him 
a light connotes the connection between them, as does her Greta Garbo-like attire. The latter 
also of course connotes femininity. 
Now, all the visual clues that aid the narratives in these black-and-white photographs have 
two important characteristics in common: they are familiar to many people, and their meaning 
                                                 
95
 See for instance Wells, Liz (ed): Photography: A Critical Introduction, third edition, Routledge 2004, page 
193 ff. 
 50 
is more or less fixed. This is of course why these narrative clues work at all. For instance, 
most people would recognize Marilyn, and most people would associate her with more or less 
the same kind of narrative. 
As I have said, most of the clues are associated with femininity and glamour. This is what 
Goldin wants to tell us – that these people – her friends – are glamorous, beautiful women, no 
different than “natural” women or film stars. 
Turning to the post 1980 pictures, I believe that this changes.  
On the whole there are fewer narrative clues in them than in the black-and-white ones. 
Furthermore, the ones that are present seem to be less familiar. They do not in the same way 
carry the obvious links to femininity and glamour that we have seen in the earlier 
photographs. 
To illustrate my point, I will compare two black-and-white photographs – Roommate in the 
kitchen and Ivy with Marilyn – with the picture called Kim at home. The latter is taken in Paris 
in 199296. Kim at home shows one of Goldin’s friends standing against a wall. She is shown 
from the hips up, and she is naked from the waist up. She wears plain earrings and a bracelet. 
The wall behind her is blank, except for a painting of a blond woman – also depicted from the 
hips up, and also nude. The three photographs display the similarity that they all show us the 
protagonist against a wall with a picture depicting a person – the roommate with the little girl, 
Ivy with Marilyn and Kim with the blond woman. As I have explained earlier there is a 
connection between the main subject and the person in the image on the wall. There is a kind 
of symmetry between them – the ones in the image lend their characteristics to the 
protagonists. But here the similarity between the three photographs ends. While the little girl 
and Marilyn are familiar subjects to most of us, with well-known characteristics, the blond 
woman in the Kim picture is not. On the contrary – she is utterly anonymous. The painting is 
executed in a style close to what we might call kitsch – the style of the common masses. The 
painting reveals nothing about her personality characteristics. In fact, the most striking thing 
about her is her nudity, and her pair of perfect breasts. And herein lies the symmetry between 
her and Kim. Kim is depicted in a similar pose, exposing her breasts. It is as if the narrative 
clues seek to suggest that, like the blond woman, Kim has perfect, female breasts, and that is 
all. End of story. In fact, truth be told, they are not perfect – the implants are too obvious, they 
are placed too far apart, the nipples are too high and too close to the central axis of the body; 
                                                 
96
 Goldin: The Other Side, page 84. 
 51 
these features give them a synthetic look – but this, though telling in its own way, is not the 
most important point here. 
The most important point, in my opinion, is that the little girl and Marilyn connote 
personalities, whereas the blond woman connotes no more than a body part. Cliché as those 
personalities might be, they are still complex enough to hint at a specific personal identity, 
affording the same to roommate and Ivy. More than that, we remember the more complex 
visual clues in the Roommate in her chair – the cloth on the wall, the summer dress, the 
position of the hands and legs etc – all working together to create the image of a beautiful 
woman. Even though roommate has no breasts, her picture is ripe with femininity. Kim, on 
the other hand, is not complex. She identifies her femininity, not with a personality, but with a 
pair of perfect breasts. 
In clinical psychology there is a therapy form called narrative therapy97. It entails recreating 
one’s life story. Stressing the patient’s resources, the therapist lingers on moments of coping 
in the face of adversity. The patient is asked to embellish those moments, using them as a 
starting point to learn new things about him/herself and his/her resources, thus creating the 
basis for a new life story. These moments are called “rich” moments, and the stories they 
underpin are called “rich” stories. The new stories are empowering stories. It seems to me that 
Goldin’s black-and-white photos similarly contain “rich” narrative clues, which may give rise 
to “rich” and empowering life stories. They afford the subjects a context, a context that is 
relatively comprehensive and not unknown to society at large. The latter pictures, on the other 
hand, of which the Kim one is a good example, do not. 
 
To conclude, I have suggested that Goldin’s use of bright and shiny colours in the post 1980 
pictures, the “snapshot” composition, the “blur” that denotes hectic movement, and the 
impoverished narration, may all be seen to illustrate the loss of identity cohesion that followed 
the deconstruction of gender systems and identities. In Goldin’s colour images I believe that 
we see this fragmentation at work in the concrete lives of people. 
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2.6 Narrative and fetishistic photography. 
In this dissertation we have seen that the transgender people were excluded from the feminist 
struggle of the 1960s and 70s (chapter 2.2). Furthermore we have seen that Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory did not recognize their existence (chapter 2.3). In the 1980s this 
changed with the advent of queer theory, Foucault’s analysis and the deconstruction of the 
two-gender system (chapter 2.4). 
While deconstruction no doubt was beneficial to the transgender community by diminishing 
the authority of a discriminatory system, it also seems to have left it in an identity vacuum. 
Offering no viable alternative its practice of parody and mis-recognition of naming probably 
also had the effect of identity fragmentation. In the preceding chapter I showed how Goldin’s 
colour photographs may be employed to illustrate this. 
Paradoxically I find that her black-and-white pictures speak of a more comprehensive and 
coherent identity, despite the subjects’ ostracized position in the 1970s. This is mainly 
because of their narrative content and the “rich” stories they tell (see the preceding chapter). 
 
The 1970s pictures are examples of what I would call narrative photography. By the term 
narrative photography I mean photography that has a comprehensive and coherent approach 
towards its subjects. The goal is to make us (the spectators) understand them better and 
sympathize with them. It stresses the common humanity of us all. The voices of the subjects 
are heard, while the artist aim at building bridges between them and us. Narrative 
photography seeks to empower and humanize its subjects. Other examples that come to mind 
are the photographs of the Farm Security Administration (FSA) in USA in the 1930s98, and 
The Family of Man exhibition at New York’s Museum of Modern Art in 1955, organized by 
Edward Steichen99. 
 
In contrast to the black-and-white pictures, Goldin’s colour photographs resemble more what 
I would call fetishistic photography. In order to explain the term fetishistic photography, I 
need to turn to some Freudian concepts. 
In chapter 2.3 I outlined his theory on gender differentiation. The end result – achieved in 
puberty – is heterosexual men and women. Concurrently there is a development in sexual 
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practice. The starting point for this development is the child’s sexual activities100. According 
to Freud the child is “polymorphously perverse”. By this he means that the child finds erotic 
pleasure in many activities and in the stimulation of multiple body zones. These activities 
stem from what he calls partial drives, and he sees both the activities and the drives as 
discontinuous and immature, normally to be abandoned later in life, subsuming them unto the 
primacy of heterosexual genital intercourse. Sexuality is thus able to fulfil its ultimate goal: 
procreation. Among these immature practices are oral and anal stimulation, genital 
masturbation, and also activities like voyeurism and sadism. Sometimes, however, the 
development is disturbed, resulting in a fixation on an immature partial drive and activity 
even in adult life. 
Fetishism is a substitution of the sexual object101. The individual shifts desire away from 
members of the other sex, and instead aims it at body parts or inanimate objects. These body 
parts and objects take on the role of sexual goals. Sexual gratification cannot be achieved 
without the presence of the fetish. Thus it too may be seen as a (pathological) fixation. Later 
in his life Freud made a connection between fetishism and the castration complex. Fetishism 
is thought of as the child’s denial of the mother’s castration, recreating her as a “complete” 
person (with penis). The chosen fetish object now represents the maternal penis. 
Freud made a psychological map of the human mind102. In it the psyche is divided in three: 
the super-ego, the ego, and the id. The super-ego is the site for internalised prohibitions (see 
chapter 2.3), and functions as kind of a conscience. The ego is the conscious mind, and it 
negotiates the demands of the id with those of the super-ego, and the needs of the individual 
with those of the external world. The id is unconscious, and the site of repressed (Oedipal) 
drives and urges. In order to keep the frightening urges (aggression, inappropriate sexual 
impulses etc) of the id unconscious, the ego resorts to defence mechanisms. One of them is 
projection103. Projection is the activity of attributing one’s own forbidden and painful feelings 
or urges to others. The desired result is that they stay unconscious in the mind of the person 
engaged in the projection. 
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These three concepts – polymorphously perverse sexuality, fetishism and projection – will 
help explain what I mean by the term “fetishistic photography”. Fetishistic photography is 
dominated by unconscious partial drives and urges (inappropriate sexuality, voyeurism, 
aggression and sadism). Like them it is neither comprehensive nor coherent. It is fragmented. 
It indulges in fetishes – objects or situations that unduly take on sexual, voyeuristic or 
aggressive significance. It functions by projection, meaning that what is portrayed is not the 
true and actual living conditions of the subjects, so much as the inner (forbidden) feelings of 
the artist and – by way of expectations and demand – the spectators. 
In his essay “Photography and fetish”, Christian Metz also underscores the photograph’s 
qualities as fetish104. Properties that he underlines are the photograph’s physical size (small 
and portable), timelessness, privacy of reception, indexical properties, properties as keepsake 
and vessel for the memory, closeness to death and mourning, and its relation to in-frame and 
off-frame matter (its cutting line). He states that the photograph means both a loss and 
protection against that loss, just as the fetish means both symbolic castration and the 
protection against it. 
The relation between fetishistic photography and parody and mis-recognition – queer theory’s 
main tools of subversion – would be that they both seek a transformation and veiling of the 
original subject. 
 
Returning to Goldin’s pictures, the Aphrodite and Javier at a sex party (taken in New York 
City in 1991) is a highly fetishistic photograph105. 
Two people are depicted. There is a young man (Javier) who is wearing some kind of biker 
cap (a common item in some gay communities), a harness (a common item in gay and straight 
S&M (sadomasochistic) activities) and a metal bracelet. Other than that he is naked from the 
waist up. The other person is Aphrodite. Only her hair (probably a wig) and her face are 
visible. She seems to be kneeling down, her face turned up toward Javier’s, her eyes closed, 
her mouth open. She is wearing heavy theatrical make-up. Javier in turn looks down on her 
face, with one hand on the top of her head and the other under her chin. It is a typical S&M 
scene depicting domination and submission, and the sexual arousal that goes with it.  
There are two aspects that I find especially interesting in this picture. 
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Firstly, there is the link to S&M. As I have mentioned, sadism (and consequently masochism) 
is – according to Freud – part of the child’s polymorphously perverse sexuality. It also, as an 
adult sexual practice, utilizes a virtual array of fetishistic objects and stereotypical roles. S&M 
is as close as you get to fetishistic sexual theatre. Secondly, there is Aphrodite’s face. She 
does indeed wear theatrical make-up, and her expression is a stereotype of sexual arousal. She 
is playing a role. Her facial features are quite obliterated by the make-up. In fact she does not 
look human at all. She looks like a puppet. All links to a “real” person underneath are gone. 
Thus this picture contains instances of immature sexual drives (sadomasochism), fetishes (the 
props of S&M) and projection (the roles of the sexual theatre). It is therefore an excellent 
example of what I would call fetishistic photography. 
 
 
2.7 Documentary photography and construction of the Other. 
The reason that such a theme as transgender people would be of interest to a serious 
professional photographic artist has to do with a development that has unfolded, both in art 
and in society at large, over many years. When it comes to art, the question is what was, and 
what is, deemed worthy of depiction. 
Along with the political revolutions of Europe and the USA in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and the subsequent shift from the old, stratified society to modern democracy came 
new ideas as to what subjects art should deal with. The old hierarchy of genres, with religious, 
mythological and historical renderings at the top and genre painting at the bottom, was 
challenged. With Realism the lives of ordinary people became the topic of contemporary art, 
and with Impressionism modern life itself. Photography would seem especially suited to 
depict both, due to what was conceived to be its close link to reality, and its availability and 
dissemination in the populace. Photography was the modern and the democratic medium par 
excellence106. 
At first photographers were mostly professionals with a studio (permanent or ambulatory), 
and dedicated (upper class) amateurs. But as the technical development brought forth smaller, 
affordable cameras, and new systems for developing film (by sending it to a laboratory), the 
practicing of photography became available to everyone. This dissemination of amateur 
photographic practice in time inspired professional artist to take up the “layman’s” topics – 
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domestic photography, and his compositional technique – the so-called “snapshot aesthetic” 
mentioned in chapter 2.5. 
From the very onset photography was deemed most suited to document events. The public 
wanted to read about these events in newspapers – and adding a picture to the article served as 
veritable “proof” as to what had actually happened. The camera could not lie, it was thought. 
It was the “grand” events that attracted attention: wars, disasters, charting uninhabited parts of 
the country, engineering feats, and the like. This was what interested the public, and thus what 
sold newspapers. In a way, these topics could perhaps be described as documentary 
photography’s parallel to the old “high genres” of painting. 
The poor and the destitute were also photographed, but often in a picturesque style resembling 
genre painting, subjects appearing as clichés and examples of specific human types rather 
than actual individuals107. Documentation of the poor and their lives was often a part of the 
reformist politics of the nineteenth century, designed to better the conditions of the “victims” 
of an unjust society. Jacob Riis is an exponent of this tradition108. 
In a way this social reform documentary tradition often depended on the division of the 
population into two groups: “us” and “them”. The “them” group was often constructed as 
Other. The term “Other” has been mentioned before in this dissertation. Constructing 
someone as the Other entails imbuing a person or a group of people with certain undesirable 
characteristics. The process parallels that of projection mentioned in chapter 2.6. The 
difference is that while projection happens on an individual level, the construction of the 
Other is a societal process. The object is – exactly as in projection – to make a group of 
people “better” than they are by externalising their flaws. The Other is considered to be 
distinctly different from the “us” group. While we may pity or sympathize with them, they are 
nevertheless kept at a safe distance. 
There was a change in the 1930s USA, in the years of the Depression, where the many 
photographers of the Farm Security Administration depicted people fallen on hard times. 
Emphasizing our common humanity and that their fate could just as well be yours or mine, 
they collapsed the division between “us” and “them” radically. The result was a new and 
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more dignified way of depicting the poor and the destitute109. This humanizing trend reached 
a peak in the 1955 The Family of Man-exhibition. 
Thus the social political trends in the 19th and 20th century helped weaken the old genre 
hierarchy, and widen the category of worthy subject matter. 
Susan Sontag stresses the heritage of Walt Whitman when she tries to explain the 
proliferation of worthy subject matter in modern society. According to Whitman all things – 
mundane and exalted alike – are beautiful and deserving of artistic rendering110. His is not so 
much a political as a philosophical and aesthetic vision. 
The result of the two visions was perhaps not so much a collapsing of the “us” and “them”-
dichotomy altogether, as a widening of the “us” category, so that is would encompass a 
greater part of the population. It brought people closer together, bringing solidarity where 
there once had been patronizing pity. 
 
It is interesting to note that as the “us” category widened, the category simultaneously started 
to disintegrate – from within. I believe that the theories of Sigmund Freud can explain the 
phenomenon. According to him we are all “monsters” of a kind – our conscious egos 
desperately trying to restrain the violent and chaotic forces of the id (see chapter 2.6). Two of 
the ways we deal with them are projection and the construction of the Other. We need those 
psychological strategies. As the “us” category widened – as “they” (the monsters) became 
“us” (decent human beings) – there was nowhere left to project our id urges. The id still 
demanded an arena for its projections, and as a result a new gap opened – within our midst. 
Now the “monster” was not “out there”. It was here, all around us, and sometimes inside us. 
This tendency is clear in a photographer like Weegee (Arthur Fellig)111. One of his topics is 
the brutality that resides in our very neighbourhood. It is also evident in Robert Frank, whose 
work displayed the alienation and eeriness of middle class America112. 
So the reason why the Other and the “them” category seem to haunt us is simply because they 
do not refer to anything external at all. It is us, you and me, and it has always been us. We 
cannot escape from our ids, but we will try – through projection and the construction of the 
Other. The minute one object of projection is gone we immediately need to find another. 
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As outlined in chapter 2.6 the ego is caught in a predicament. While the id urges are too 
frightening and devastating to be confronted head on, they are still extremely alluring. The 
desire to give in to our immediate impulses – sexual, aggressive or otherwise – holds a 
fascination for us. We are destined to wish for that desire fulfilment. Constructing the Other 
and projecting the id desires onto it not only enables us to keep unpleasant feelings at bay, but 
it also allows us to “enjoy” those feelings as they unfold in the life of the Other. 
These two mechanisms – avoidance and enjoyment by proxy – will explain the ever-recurring 
presence of the Other. 
These considerations are consistent with the Lacanian concept of “stolen jouissance”113. In a 
parallel to Freud Lacan argues that we tend to transfer the pleasures that our super-ego does 
not permit us to indulge in to the Other – other social groups, other races etc. Thus they 
become the object of our hatred, disgust, fascination and envy. One example that springs to 
mind is the tendency to endow “natives” with increased and unfettered libido. 
Thus, what documentary photography of the Other portrays is not other people, different from 
us. It is us, our own minds externalised and made objects. This is the societal variant of what I 
called fetishistic photography in chapter 2.6. 
 
Another way to consider the nature of a photograph is to see it as a kind of memory. It freezes 
a moment in time and preserves it for us. It shows us what once was, but will never be again, 
and is thus a kind of memento mori. The picture becomes an object for contemplation and 
mourning. This function exploits what Roland Barthes called the having-been-there 
relationship of the photograph to its referent114. 
It seems to me that this is yet another instance of the psyche’s strategies of projection and 
externalisation. Choosing an external object to embody our grief and our memory aids us in 
escaping melancholy – as melancholy is the internalisation in the ego of mourning115. 
The mode of photography that is most relevant to this psychic mechanism would be family 
photography. Family photography may be viewed as a sub-category of documentary, one that 
assumes a close relationship between subject matter and spectator. 
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One might say that photography as memory is yet another strategy to keep our psyche 
balanced. 
 
A third possibility is to consider the photo as a story-telling device, a co-creator of narratives. 
I have outlined this approach in chapters 2.5 and 2.6. 
The psychic correlate to the narrative is the ego (see chapter 2.6). The ego is the psychic 
entity that has the function of mitigating between the impulses of the id and the demands of 
the super-ego, and between the needs of the subject and the reality of the outside world. In so 
doing the ego creates psychic schemata, or stories, that are coherent and comprehensive and 
that ultimately give rise to what we call an identity. Plainly put, the ego makes up “the story 
of who we are” in order to make sense of ourselves, and the world we live in. 
 
To summarise, I have identified documentary photography by three functions and their 
psychic equivalents: as a rendering of the Other coupled with the projection and 
externalisation of id desires – what I call fetishistic photography, as a memento helping the 
psyche to avoid melancholia, and as a story-telling device aiding the structuring tasks of the 
ego – what I call narrative photography. 
 
I will now turn to Goldin and related photographers. 
Many different social groups and individuals have taken on the role of the Other in 
documentary photography and the approach towards them has varied. There is the outsider in 
Riis’ social programme, Weegee’s criminal next door, and the alienated American middle 
class in Frank’s pictures. The artist’s approach has been either to maintain the division 
between “us” and “them” (Riis), to place the Other in our midst (Weegee) or to show that we 
are all Other (Frank). Of these three I think that Weegee works in a manner closest to the 
fetishistic photography, with his topic of urban nocturnal violence. 
Two groups of people that have enjoyed enormous popularity as Other are the sexual deviants 
and the substance abusers.  
Larry Clark’s drug addicts, and Mary Ellen Mark and Christer Strömholm’s transgender 
people are examples116. 
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In his Tulsa (1971) Larry Clark literally identifies with the drug addicts. Having been a 
substance abuser himself he photographs people from his own environment. He treats them 
with dignity. The pictures are not obviously fetishistic. I therefore feel that this project is a 
narrative one. He wants to lend the subjects a voice and he wants us to get to know them 
better, appealing to our common humanity to include them in our “us” category. His later 
projects on the other hand, like Teenage Lust and The Perfect Childhood, seems to be more 
explicitly sexual and voyeuristic, crossing the line into fetishistic photography and 
constructing the subjects as Other117. 
Mary Ellen Mark in Falkland Road (1981) has photographed transgender prostitutes in 
Bombay. Her approach too is definitely a narrative one. She spent a lot of time getting to 
know her subjects, and she wants to tell their story as truthfully as she can. The introduction 
text where Mark tells us about the everyday life of her subjects strengthens the narrative 
approach of her book. 
Christer Strömholm also lived in close proximity to his Parisian transgender subjects in the 
1950s and 60s. Like Mark and Clark (in Tulsa) his photographs are of the narrative kind. 
Strömholm portrays his characters with humour, warmth and sympathy. 
 
Goldin, in The Other Side, admits that the object of her book is to pay homage to her 
transgender friends118. Her intention is clearly to follow an approach parallel to that of 
Strömholm, Mark and Clark (in Tulsa) – to humanize her subjects, to broaden our minds, and 
to make us accept them in the family of man. She clearly wants to make what I call narrative 
photography. 
In her 1970s black-and-white pictures I think she succeeds. She has lived among her subjects 
and gained their trust, and her knowledge of them is comprehensive. As such she is in a 
perfect position to tell the true story about them, and to bridge the gap between them and us. 
To this end she employs visual clues that link the subjects’ narratives to our own. Furthermore 
she avoids overtly fetishistic devices that might have taken our attention away from her 
objective. Her black-and-white pictures are thus in my opinion – despite the projective 
potential of their subject matter – mainly narrative, and as such supportive of the (identity) 
structuring function of the ego. 
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The colour photos are different. In chapter 2.5 I pointed out that they both formally and 
thematically reflect the fragmentation of gender narratives. I also feel that they are more 
voyeuristic. In the late 1970s and in the 1980s Goldin lived in a poor and derelict 
neighbourhood of New York City. Her friends were prostitutes, substance abusers and 
individuals on the fringe of society. In these years she compiled the collection The Ballad of 
Sexual Dependency (photo-book published in 1986). The images here are much more brutal 
and overtly sexual than the black-and-white photos in The Other Side. It is my impression that 
the colour pictures in The Other Side are a continuation of the style of The Ballad. With their 
fewer narrative clues, their more sexual, violent and voyeuristic content, and their formal 
features connoting fragmentation (see chapter 2.5), they are closer to fetishistic photography. 
As such they do not help in structuring the identity position of the subjects. On the contrary: 
they construct them as Other, and assert that they belong to the “them” category. 
 
In her early career Goldin often showed her photos to her circle of friends first. They were 
frequently the same people that appeared in the pictures. The presenting mode was often slide 
shows. In a way, she intended the pictures to be a kind of family photographs, portraying her 
“extended family” as she called them. The having-been-there relationship to the referent 
would have been strong, as the subject matter would have been very familiar to the spectators. 
Thus the images would function as memorabilia of their lives, and reminders of friends lost to 
drugs and AIDS. In this way they must have acted as a defence against melancholia. 
With the rising fame of the artist came a widening of the audience. Now the spectators did not 
have first hand knowledge of the subject matter, and the pictures must have lost some of their 
closeness to their referent and their quality as memorabilia and mourning pieces. 
 
 
2.8 The Real. 
Earlier I wrote that Judith Butler – the post-modern feminist par excellence – claimed that 
there is no gender outside discourse (chapter 2.4). She went even further, positing that organic 
sex and the body itself are discursive constructions. Her argument is that each time we think, 
speak or write about gender, sex and the body we cannot avoid using concepts that are already 
caught up in prevalent discourse and thus determined by it. Taken to its extreme, the ultimate 
consequence of Butler’s view would be that noting, neither gender nor anything else – 
abstract or material, exist outside language and discourse. 
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I think that Butler’s statements are tautological. The claim that all we can say and write about 
gender and sex is confined to discourse is self-evident, since the language we are obliged to 
use is that of discourse. But Butler makes the basic assumption that thinking, speaking and 
writing are the only ways to gain knowledge of gender and sex – that the only source of 
knowledge is through the intellect, language and discourse. I believe that this is the source of 
her tautology, and that it simply is not true. I think that there are kinds of knowledge that are 
independent of language, and that they stem not from our thoughts, speech or writings on a 
subject, but from our mere being. 
 
In order to explain what I mean I will offer some examples. These are meant to show that 
there are indeed non-discursive entities, both in our past and in our present, which affect our 
lives in a very tangible way. 
Imagine that you are on the Palatine Hill in ancient Rome. You are in Emperor Augustus’ 
apartment. Your task is to tell him about the Antarctic. We assume that he has never heard of 
the South Pole before. Augustus may be fascinated by what you tell him of that alien place, 
but probably it won’t matter much to him. The Antarctic is not part of his discourse, and 
therefore he deems it to be pretty unimportant. But you may correct him. You may tell him 
that if it hadn’t been for the South Pole and all the water trapped in the ice there, Rome 
probably wouldn’t exist. The Forum, the Mars Marches and all of the Lazio plains would be 
flooded due to rising sea levels. Also, the saline composition of the world’s oceans would 
have been altered, along with the marine creatures. The ocean currents would have changed, 
probably with an impact on the Mare Nostrum (the Mediterranean) too. 
The exact nature of the physical implications of the existence of the South Pole to Augustus’ 
Rome is not what is important here. The important thing is that there were such implications, 
and that they affected Roman life. 
The next example is from the Middle Ages. Imagine a peasant walking in the highlands 
gathering wild berries. Suddenly he stumbles upon a fossil of a dinosaur. Surely he would 
have no idea what it was. Perhaps he would call it a “petrified dragon” at best. Again, as with 
the South Pole, the significance of the found structure would evade him. And again, you could 
offer him some information to link his everyday life to the creature. You could tell him that 
these are the remains of a dinosaur, and that the hens on his farm probably are distant 
descendents of dinosaurs119. So if it hadn’t been for the extinct animals, he would not have 
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been able to have an egg in the morning. This might get his attention, but he would probably 
soon return to his daily chores, offering the fossil no further thought. Nevertheless, the 
existence of the dinosaurs, hitherto unknown to him, had indeed had a material impact on his 
life. 
 
Returning to Butler, the crucial question to ask is whether or not the South Pole existed to 
Augustus, and whether or not the dinosaurs had existed to the farmer. It seems to me that if 
we are going to follow her logic, the answer would have to be “no, it did not”, and “no, they 
had not”. Seeing that both were non-discursive entities, exempt from language (at that time), 
they cannot have existed. The problem is that this answer seems to defy all common sense. In 
fact we would claim to know that the Antarctic did exist at the time of ancient Rome, and that 
dinosaurs were part of the history of Middle Age man. The only way the two could have been 
said not to exist is as discursive entities. As discursive entities neither the South Pole nor the 
dinosaurs existed at those times. Consequently, Butler’s claim must be read as: No discursive 
entity can exist outside discourse. 
Read like this, I believe that the tautological and self-evident nature of her reasoning becomes 
quite clear. 
While they did not exist in discourse, they did exist in another, very material way. And they 
had a concrete impact on both Augustus and the farmer. Both of them would have “known” 
about their impacts – Augustus every time he strolled across the dry land of the Forum, and 
the farmer every time he ate his egg. This kind of knowing comes from being, and it cannot 
be equated to discursive knowledge. I choose to call it knowledge-in-being. 
Butler’s view on existence is what I would call a very anthropocentric view. Allowing 
discourse and language to define existence by way of the singular human intellect, she sets the 
human race apart from the rest of creation, depriving us of the common knowledge that stems 
from being and that we share with every living creature. 
 
A writer that leaves a place for the latter knowledge is Lacan (chapter 2.3). 
Lacan operates with a category (or Order, as he calls it) that approximates the Butlerian 
discourse. It is the Symbolic120. It is, just like discourse, determined by language and the 
power relations expressed therein. The Lacanian Order of the Imaginary – a childhood 
developmental category that we have encountered in chapter 2.3 – is not so interesting to us in 
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this line of reasoning. But Lacan’s third Order is very interesting indeed. It is the Order of the 
Real121. 
It is my impression that to Lacan the Real is a kind of leftover category. In it goes everything 
in the grown-up’s life that doesn’t subsume to the Symbolic as dictated by language and the 
Law-of-the-Father. It is the category of the “unmentionables” – the things that cannot be put 
to words or subjected to reason. It may be that he was thinking of the Real as a “locus” where 
id urges reside. I think that it may be used to further analyse the concepts of knowing and 
being. 
To differentiate between the orders of the Symbolic and the Real – in my way of thinking – I 
will once again resort to an example. 
Imagine that all the people in the world are gathered on the slopes of a huge natural 
amphitheatre. On the scene stands a man holding a rock. Let us imagine that everybody has 
decided one thing: they will try to make the stone fall upwards. But every time the man in the 
middle drops it, it falls to the ground – downwards. No matter what incantation they use, no 
matter what pleads or threats, the stone will always fall downwards. The stone falling to the 
ground upon being dropped is an event that takes place in the Real. But suddenly a spectator 
finds a way to make their wish come true. The solution is to interchange the meaning of the 
words “downwards” and “upwards”. This way what was “upwards” before now becomes 
“downwards”, and vice versa. Now, every time the stone leaves the hand it falls upwards. The 
falling upwards of the stone takes place in the Symbolic. 
The example tells us that there are events that unfold oblivious to our will, reasoning and 
control, but also that we are free to deal with them as we please on a discursive and linguistic 
level. 
To my mind the objects and events that belong to the Real are exactly those we are unable to 
control. It may be entities we do not know about – as in the examples with Augustus and the 
farmer. In fact, events that we know nothing about which still have an affect on us occur 
every day. To take a very common event: Each hour our brains are bombarded by a huge 
number of neural stimuli that we are never aware of. For instance, the body proper will send a 
huge number of messages to the central nervous system that go unnoticed by our conscious 
mind. From our joints emanate endless information streams as to the location of our limbs and 
trunk. From our gastro-intestinal tract comes information about its degree of distension. The 
list goes on and on. Even though very few of these stimuli ever reach the cerebral cortex, we 
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depend on them for our well-being, and we act on them even when they are subconscious122. 
These streams of subconscious neural information are other examples of events taking place 
in the Real. 
Physical drives may take place in the Real as well. Overwhelming hunger and thirst for 
instance. The feeling in your gut when extremely hungry is not just a Symbolic entity – its 
“physical” presence deafens words and thoughts and cramps the mind. 
Extreme emotions act in the same way. I am not talking about the neat cap in hand emotions 
that come knocking on the door of your consciousness asking politely to be let inside. I am 
talking about overwhelming, stunning emotions, such as rage and jealousy. They don’t ask for 
admittance to your conscious mind. They run your mind’s wall down with a bulldozer and 
wreak havoc in there, oblivious to your presence. 
In my version the Real consists of various elements – for example natural events, bodily 
stimuli, physical urges, extreme emotions, events or objects hidden by our lack of knowledge. 
What they have in common is that they evade our intellect, our reason, and thus we cannot 
manipulate or control them. 
This brings me to two of the most characteristic aspects of the Real, as I see it, and also two of 
its most disturbing ones: it is utterly alien and autonomic. Compared to our conscious minds it 
is something else entirely. Even when we scrutinize it, as with the laws of natural science, we 
do not control it. We merely describe and predict. Our descriptions and predictions take place 
in the Symbolic, while the actual events always take place in the Real. It is as if the Real has 
made its own set of rules, in a language we cannot hope to grasp with our conscious minds. 
Furthermore, the Real seems oblivious to us – to our conscious minds, our civilization, our 
culture and even our power. It is like a giant machine that works in mysterious ways, hidden 
to us. It is not only indifferent to our presence. It does not even seem to notice that we are 
there. 
This is a very scary aspect of the Real. I am not sure whether it is in our capacity to truly 
embrace it. To know that there are workings afoot that are impervious to the conscious mind, 
the ego, the “I”, and even the “we” – that is a frightening thought indeed. And yet it may offer 
some help as to our topic – the concept of identity, or more specifically the concept of gender 
identity. 
It is important to understand that the Real, the way I understand it here, does not amount to a 
kind of essentialism (chapter 2.3). Both essentialism and constructivism are part of human 
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discourse. They are determined by reason and language. They are the result of the human 
effort to understand and control the world. The Real, on the other hand, is not a part of 
discourse. As I explained earlier it works on a different plane. It will not subsume to the 
efforts of the consciousness to understand. It is alien and autonomic. Thus it cannot be 
categorized as essentialism. Neither can its knowledge-in-being be equated to the Butlerian 
claim that gender is a practice and not a stable identity characteristic. The practices and the 
deeds she talks about take place within discourse, and they are also instances of the attempts 
of the human consciousness to position itself within the world. 
Being neither essential nor constructed, but something else entirely, the Real may perhaps be 
clarified a bit more using terms from the field of religion. The Real is neither parallel to the 
theological explanation of the human state, nor to the pious life and practice of the believer, 
but to the very mystery of God Himself and His divine plans – seen from His perspective, not 
ours. Few believers would object to the notion that God and His plans are for the most part 
incomprehensible to us, and that we cannot ever understand them as He does. Still they would 
assuredly maintain that His acts and plans have a profound impact on our lives. Our 
understanding of God and His plans takes place in the Symbolic and in discourse, but God 
Himself exists on a different level altogether. 
Earlier I characterized Butler’s model as anthropocentric. Placing the human intellect at the 
centre of existence it is also a model of pride and hybris. I must admit I find such a lack of 
humility misplaced and unfounded. It also has dangerous consequences, as all hybris does, 
since it may cut us off from interaction with a greater community. Accepting the category of 
the Real can re-introduce a proper humility and a deeper understanding of our actual place 
and role in creation. 
 
Can photography play a role in the knowledge-in-being of the Real? Surprisingly, I think it 
can. I will illustrate it with an example. 
There is a picture in The Other Side that seems to imply that something “else” is afoot. It is 
Jimmy Paulette and Tabboo! in the bathroom (sic)123 (taken in New York City in 1991). In it 
there are two people. Both are depicted from the waist up, and both are nude. Tabboo! has a 
necklace of sorts – perhaps the strap of a garment with an open back. She is standing with her 
back to us and her face turned away. Jimmy stands next to Tabboo!, her upper body in a three-
quarter profile and her face turned towards us. She has put her left hand on Tabboo!’s right 
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shoulder. She looks straight at the camera. She is wearing heavy make-up. To the left in the 
picture is what seems to be a doorpost or the corner of a wall – the blur makes it hard to tell. 
Behind Tabboo! (i.e. further into the picture space) and partly hidden by her is a frame of 
some kind. It is difficult to make it out exactly, but it may be a window, a door, or possibly a 
cupboard. To the right is the corner (or open end) of a (semi?) wall, with some kind of knob 
attached to it. 
This is a mysterious picture, and one of my favourites. As with any great image, it has a 
number of interpretational levels. 
Here I will focus on the aspects that may be said to hint at the Real. These are the position of 
the subjects and the spatial configuration. 
As I said Tabboo! is standing with her back to us, and she is facing away from us. It is as if 
though she is denying us access to information about her. Furthermore, she is looking into the 
recesses of the room, partaking in a reality that is hidden from our sight by her and Jimmy’s 
bodies. In a way, she is “something else”, “somewhere else”. We have no access to her 
reality. Her name may be a (humorous) comment on that inaccessibility. She is taboo – 
forbidden, untouchable. Jimmy, on the other hand, may function as a bridge between Tabboo! 
and our world, turning towards us and looking at us. Or perhaps she is a decoy, showing us 
only what we would expect to see, but not the private world of Tabboo!. This is by far the 
most exciting interpretation I think. 
The spatial configuration is also strange. It is very hard to figure it out. We know from the 
title that it’s a bathroom, but what is the front and back of it? Is it a door or a window in the 
background? Is it a doorpost or a corner on the left? Is it a corner or end of a (semi?) wall on 
the right? It is perplexing, and adds to the slightly eerie feeling that this scene takes place in a 
slightly different “reality”. 
But the prize alienator of them all is the angle of the corner/wall-end on the right. It does not 
follow the rules of perspective. The corner/end is tilted and slanting. This element, more than 
any other, gives the picture a slightly “cubist” quality and gives us the feeling that this scene 
takes place “somewhere else”, somewhere beyond our comprehension. 
To me the slanting wall is the punctum of the picture, referring to Roland Barthes’ concepts 
the studium and the punctum124. According to him, the studium of a photograph is the 
information it offers when we examine it. The information may be there as part of the artist’s 
intention, and it refers to our common knowledge and culture. It is a kind of interpretation, 
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and it speaks to our intellects. The punctum, on the other hand, is that which strikes us 
immediately and non-verbally in the picture. It is not intended to be there by the artist. It is an 
individual entity, and it will be experienced differently from one person to the next. In 
Camera Lucida, Barthes concludes that to him the punctum of the picture of his mother is the 
realisation that she really was there, in front of the camera, but that she is no more125. 
Could one say that the studium part of the Goldin picture – its “interpretation” – would 
correspond to the events taking place on the Symbolic and discursive level? And could one 
also say that its punctum corresponds to the events taking place on the level of the Real? 
Could one say that what Barthes calls the punctum actually is the Real manifesting itself 
(differently for each and every one of us) in the photograph? It is an exciting possibility. 
If this is so, it will mean that photos hold more “information” than what is evident on a 
discursive level. More than that, this non-discursive “information” is in a way more 
“important” to us than the discursive one. It is that which catches our attention. And we 
recognize it – on a different level than the picture’s discursive information – because it 
corresponds to something in us, something very basic to us. 
This could open up a whole new category of photography: Real photography. It would 
probably be difficult to practice though, since it possibly would work differently in each and 
every one of us, and since it, at the very moment it was contemplated, planned, composed, 
exhibited and interpreted, would become discursive rather than Real. Thus it cannot be. The 
Real can never be subject to any planned practice – executive, interpretational or other. It can 
only be subject to guesses, hunches and speculations. That is what I am doing here. 
Nevertheless I am convinced that it can, and does, have an effect on us. Its effects are 
probably greater than we will ever realize. I also believe that it is present in photography. 
 
Accepting a Real existence and power means not only that we are obliged to be more humble 
when it comes to our place in creation – unquestionably a very good thing indeed – but we are 
also invited to reflect on important concepts such as “truth” and “authority” in a new way. 
These are of course concepts very pertinent to the definition of identity categories. I will 
return to this subject in the last chapter of the exposition. 
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2.9 Asian gender diversity. 
A pretty large part of Goldin’s colour photos in The Other Side are from her trip to Thailand 
and the Philippines. 
I have decided not to analyse them at any great length. The reason for this is twofold: Firstly, 
the two countries have their own complex gender diversity and gender identity discourse, and 
I do not feel that I know them well enough to perform a detailed analysis. Secondly, the 
original, indigenous elements in them sometimes differ so much from Western discourse that 
they may prove only to complicate my analysis, which is directed at the state of affairs in the 
West. I will, however, mention some major points in order to underpin some of my earlier 
statements126. 
The first point is what I just mentioned – that these two countries have gender categories and 
gender discourses of their own and that they do not conform to the Western ones in all their 
aspects. Both countries have traditional gender discourses, as well as more modern ones, 
partly influenced by outside cultures and occupants. The result is a complex and original mix 
of old and new. For instance, Thailand traditionally had a three-gender system – taken from 
Buddhist origin myths – of man, woman, and kathoey. The latter was a biological 
hermaphrodite and an independently existing third sex. It was considered to be an 
intermediate category. Inspired by the Hindu idea of union of opposites, transgender people 
were metaphors of cosmic unity, mediating between the divine and the mundane world. 
Today, however, under the influence of Western “scientific” or biomedical discourse, the term 
kathoey has come to describe a male transgender category including transvestites, 
hermaphrodites, transsexuals and effeminate homosexuals. The mediating role is now 
between indigenous and Western popular culture127. 
The Philippines traditionally had the prestigious and powerful babyalan – women or 
transvestite males performing rituals and healing. Today they have the much less prestigious 
bakla – described as males with a feminine “heart”. In both cases the development is based on 
the influence of both indigenous and foreign factors128. 
These examples illustrate that both countries have had a change in their gender systems with 
time. It is yet another instance of the instability of gender systems. The fact that Thailand and 
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the Philippines have different gender categories and gender discourses than ours shows that 
not only do gender systems vary temporally, but they vary geographically as well. In fact, all 
through the ages, all over the globe, there has been a multitude of different gender systems. 
Variants have occurred in for example North America (the Native Americans), Brazil, India, 
Polynesia, Thailand, the Philippines and the West129. This variation again demonstrates that 
the categories of gender, stable and self-evident as they may seem, are in fact quite the 
opposite. 
The second point that Asian gender categories makes clear, is that the “truths” of gender 
systems may be founded on a variety of authorities – “scientific” as well as non-scientific. In 
this chapter we have encountered a “third gender” being rooted in Buddhism and Hinduism. 
The Western “scientific” tradition has also influenced gender discourse in Thailand and the 
Philippines. The latter country has also had influences from Spanish Catholic and Arab 
Muslim cultures. This goes to show that the authority on which the “truth” about gender 
categories rests is not always an “objective” scientific one. This fact further destabilises the 
gender systems’ claim to universality and self-evidence. 
 
Goldin’s pictures from Thailand and the Philippines are mostly taken in bars in Bangkok and 
Manila in 1992. They illustrate, in my opinion, the problems that arise when an artist ventures 
into an unknown territory. In the far Eastern culture Goldin is a foreigner and a stranger. The 
consequence is that the photographs seem to be more heterogeneous than the Western ones. 
They contain a variety of partly contradicting elements. Some of the pictures are narrative – 
some are more fetishistic. Some are formally composed, while others are in the snapshot 
tradition. The themes vary from striptease nudity, family photographs, beauty contests, 
entertainment shows and general bar scenes. It is true that especially the formal aspects of 
Goldin’s photographs vary in much of her work. But in her Asian pictures the variation 
extends to the themes and to the photographic approach (narrative versus fetishistic) as well. 
To me the story that Goldin tells about Asian transgender identity is thus one of mild 
confusion. 
Owing to their heterogeneous character, it is hard to pick a representative picture. I have 
chosen one that illustrates the close relationship between Thai transgender identity and beauty 
and glamour: Yogo modeling onstage (sic!) (taken in Bangkok in 1992)130. The composition is 
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formal. It depicts the subject in a wonderful pink dress with spangles and pearls. She stands 
against a staircase and a wall illuminated by pink light. On the right is what seems to be a 
metallic sculpture of a human. Yogo is wearing heavy make-up and earrings. She is a 
traditional glamorous beauty in the vein of Colette in Colette at home (see chapter 2.2 and 
2.5). The Yogo picture may exemplify the difficulty in comparing foreign and familiar 
conditions – with a multitude of unknown factors making the comparison hard despite 
seemingly obvious similarities and differences – and the resulting difficulty in telling the 
“whole”, “true” story of the subject. 
 
 
2.10 Truth and authority. 
In this final chapter of the exposition I will focus on concepts such as truth and authority in 
relation to gender identity and photography. 
In chapters 2.1 and 2.2 I wrote about the so-called two-gender system. I wanted to show that 
its claim to be a universal, self-evident system is not tenable. I did this partly by 
demonstrating that it has not been the prevailing gender system through all of history. It has a 
history of its own, with an emergence at a specific point in time. So it cannot claim to be 
universal in time. In the preceding chapter we have seen that it is not universal in space either. 
The gender systems vary according to geographical and cultural point-of-view. 
First and foremost it is Foucault’s analysis, deconstruction and queer theory that have 
deprived the two-gender system of its claim to universal truth and authority. This is evidently 
beneficial, since the system is based on discrimination, power differences and exclusion. 
Nevertheless the modes of critique mentioned here are two-edged swords, as I mentioned in 
chapter 2.6. They potentially can overthrow any gender system based on a claim to truth and 
authority. 
The question now becomes whether or not we, as human beings, need gender systems based 
on truth and authority. I believe that we do. I also believe that we need “truths” that are non-
factual but still authoritative. In a way, I think that we need those even more than the factual 
ones. This point needs clarification. 
There are truths that we accept without much thought. They are the so-called facts of natural 
sciences, statistics and the like. They have great authority as objective truths – more than any 
other – owing to the scientific methods they employ, including such standards as reliability 
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and validity131. For instance, no one can seriously doubt the magnitude of the gravitational 
acceleration constant (the g; 9,8 m/s2 on earth). Once “proved” it becomes an undisputable 
fact. Still, such undisputable facts, immensely authoritative as they are, matter little to us. For 
the great majority they do not concern us. So long as they “function” properly, we don’t offer 
them much thought. But even these types of facts may cause controversy among small groups 
of individuals, namely the scientists that have made them their occupation. I am sure that the 
“g” was once a source of much heated debate within scientific circles, even if the rest of the 
population couldn’t care less. 
This makes for an interesting point. It seems that the importance that we place on so-called 
truths is not related to their objective authority as truths (their validity and reliability), but 
depends on the interest that we have vested in them. The more “emotional” investment we 
have made in them, the more they matter to us, and the more we tend to argue over them. This 
is the reason why the two-gender system matters so much to us – it concerns us on a much 
deeper emotional level than for example the magnitude of the “g”. And it is the reason why 
the concept pair “man-woman” – and not for instance the pair “Persian-Siamese cats” – has 
stirred such heated debate. The latter pair, while indifferent to the vast majority of the 
population, would however probably stir up controversy in cat-breeder circles. 
So it actually seems that the “truths” that really matter to us, the ones that are the source of the 
most heated debates, are the ones with the least authority as truths (low validity and 
reliability). In fact they are more like convictions and suppositions than truths. These are the 
“truths” of religion, politics, nationalism, race, gender etc. Contrary to the immensely 
authoritative facts of for instance natural science they represent truths that immediately 
concern each and every one of us at a deep emotional level. In fact, the emotional investment 
in such “dubious” truths is so widespread and so strong – sometimes people give their lives to 
uphold them – that their importance to us must be immense. We need them. And we need 
them in quite another and psychologically more fundamental way than the truths of for 
instance natural science. Paradoxical as it may sound, we need truths to believe in. The reason 
may be that they offer a final answer to the important questions. Natural science cannot do 
this. It can only offer temporary answers in an endless regression of new questions that leave 
us without emotional closure. 
This far in this chapter I have suggested the following: Firstly, that the importance we place 
on truths is not related to their scientific authority, but to the emotional investment that we 
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make in them. Secondly, that these un-authoritative truths matter very much to us, so much in 
fact that some of us are willing to die to uphold them. We need them. 
 
At the same time we also need our important truths to carry some kind of authority. This 
authority is not the same as the objective authority of natural science. It is the authority of 
personal emotional conviction. 
Accepting that we are in need of authoritative truths that matter to us emotionally, the 
question now becomes whether or not it is possible to have such truths while at the same time 
avoiding discrimination. I believe that it is possible. The “old” grand narratives – of which the 
two-gender system was one – claimed a universal, “objective” authority. Today, thanks to 
Foucault’s analysis, deconstruction and queer theory, this claim is no longer tenable. But still 
I do believe that we may have “grand” narratives – common convictions and truths that many 
people believe in – based not on objective, but on subjective authority. 
The categorization of truths as based on either objective or subjective authority has some 
important implications. Admitting that a truth is based on subjective authority means giving 
up absolute and universal definitional power over it. It also means admitting that no one has 
the power to sanction people who think differently. It means that we believe in these truths 
not because they hold any objective authority or because we are afraid of sanctions, but 
because we realise that we need them. These truths are volitional. We need them to give our 
lives meaning and purpose – to provide the narratives that the ego needs in order to structure 
the world. They may be “grand” narratives – i.e. shared by many – or “minor” ones, shared by 
smaller groups, or held just by a single individual. Their authority is not dependent on the 
number of people that subscribe to them. 
 
So far in this chapter I have listed two kinds of truths: The objective truths like those of 
natural science, and the subjective truths of emotionally invested narratives. The first hold 
extensive definitional power, the latter do not. Both are discursive truths, and their domain is 
the Symbolic. 
As we saw in chapter 2.8, there is another kind of “truth”. It is the truths of the Real. It is non-
discursive and its domain is the Real. 
 
Let us now see how all this pertains to gender identity. 
The essentialist view on gender claims to be based on objective, scientific truths. As I stated 
in chapter 2.1, the correspondence between the scientific findings and gender traits is not 
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clear-cut. The findings – the presence or absence of particular chromosomes or genes, the 
amount of sex hormone in the blood etc – are of a general nature, and their “translation” into 
the complex world of gender identity is problematic to say the least. The problem seems to be 
this: scientific facts are formulated in a different “language” than the language we employ to 
interpret them. The facts are formulated in the language of numbers, ratios and the like. But 
when we interpret them we are bound to use the words and concepts of prevailing discourse. 
The more we have a vested interest in that discourse, the more likely we are to project our 
“prejudices” onto the meaning of the scientific facts when we interpret them. Thus scientific 
language and interpretational language are of a different nature, or level. All this contributes 
to the big problem with an essentialist view: how to correctly interpret the scientific facts. As 
a result the author of this dissertation cannot see that gender essentialism can rightfully claim 
the status of objective truth. 
The view that gender is altogether culturally constructed is also problematic as an objectively 
authoritative truth. Firstly, it dismisses the findings of natural science, which are objective 
despite the difficulty of their interpretation. The scientific facts tell us that there is 
“something” organic there. We just don’t know the full meaning of it. Secondly, 
constructivism falsely dismisses non-discursive knowledge (the knowledge-in-being of the 
Real) as a source of identity. Accordingly, constructivism cannot be seen as objectively 
authoritative when it comes to the question of the nature of gender identity. 
The Real may be a basis for gender identity as shown in chapter 2.8. Sadly, it can never be 
proven. So it too must be dismissed as an objective basis. 
The conclusion must be that as of today we have no way of describing gender that can lay 
claim to objective truth and authority. Consequently, gender identity remains anchored in 
subjective authority alone.  
This does not mean that gender identity is an unimportant part of our lives. On the contrary, it 
is exactly one of those immensely important truths vested with great emotional value that I 
described earlier. But it does mean that no one – natural scientists, humanistic scientists and 
feminists included – can claim to know the objective truth about it. No one holds absolute 
definitional power. Because no one holds it, everybody holds it. Gender identity – as of today 
– has a basis in subjective, not objective authority. This means that any group, or any 
individual, can define their own gender identity, and they will always be right. They alone 
have access to the truth about themselves, and no one can authoritatively tell them otherwise. 
Of course this doesn’t mean that other people cannot utter a different opinion. It only means 
that they cannot bolster their different opinion with the claim to objective truth. 
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This situation opens up for a plethora of “grand” gender narratives, and smaller ones. They 
may have a basis in discourse, such as essentialism and constructivism, or in the Real. Their 
importance to each and every one of us will depend not on any objective authority, but on the 
personal emotions we invest in them. 
The situation also opens up for a lesson in tolerance. We will learn that my truths, while very 
important to me, will not be any more authoritative than my neighbour’s. Consequently I 
cannot, and hopefully will not, dismiss his truths. It is my hope that this will open up for 
narratives that are non-discriminating. 
 
It is my hope that showing each group and each individual that they hold supreme subjective 
authority will allow everyone to create personal gender narratives with confidence. It is my 
belief that we need a multiplicity of gender narratives. In chapter 2.1 I suggested that nature 
thrives on diversity, in contrast to the discursive alignment of peer pressure. One might just as 
well say that the Real thrives on diversity, contrary to the taxonomic rigidity of scientific 
discourse. One might speculate that diversity is an end in itself for the Real. Perhaps the Real 
can be likened to a living, sentient mechanism that wants to try out all its options and all its 
possibilities, as if to learn by trial and error, or simply to know what it means to be – to be all 
that it can be. Similarly, multiple narratives – on whatever basis they may rest – can help the 
human race to know what it’s like to be all that it can be. 
 
What are the consequences for photography? 
Narrative photography seems perfectly suited to tell comprehensive stories about gender 
identities. This is exactly the kind of photography that strives to tell the “whole story” about 
its subjects, lending them a voice of their own. The artist should endeavour to tell an in-depth 
story in a way that the spectator can relate to, balancing the individual with the collective. 
Preferably the narrative photographer should choose a subject that he or she knows intimately, 
or at least one that he or she has the intention of getting to know intimately. This is to ensure 
that he/she gets the story as the subjects want it to be told – that the story is “true” and not just 
the result of the artist’s own projections. Narrative photography thus has a terrific opportunity 
to bolster and affirm subjective gender narratives. 
In contrast to the narrative approach there is the projective one of fetishistic photography. One 
example is the kind of “tourist” documentary photography where a professional goes off to 
some far-away spot and returns with a set of beautiful, exotic pictures, often depicting 
festivals and the like, which he/she then presents as the “exciting truth about these fascinating 
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people”. For instance, I have often seen pictures of catholic festivals and parades from foreign 
countries. I have asked myself what these pictures have to do with catholic faith. Being a 
catholic myself, I know a thing or two about it. It looks to me as if the photographer actually 
knows very little about catholic faith, and that he or she only wants to present us with the 
stereotypes of “exotic”, “archaic” religion: the huge Madonna sculptures, the colourful 
crowds, the strong emotions, the simple but devout women, and so on. Contrary to narrative 
photography this kind of photography is superficial and stereotypical. It teaches us nothing 
new and only cements our prejudices. It is a vehicle for our id projections, and has nothing to 
do with enhancing our understanding of other people. 
It should be obvious that I call for more narrative in-depth photography and less fetishistic 
photography – “tourist” documentary or other. The former approach will help establish and 
affirm gender identities – the latter will only fragment them. 
 
Sigmund Freud had a somewhat pessimistic view on the human condition in modern 
societies132. According to him, the id exerts pressure on each individual to seek immediate 
gratification of their id desires, while the community on the whole depends on the restraining 
forces of the ego and the super-ego to stay intact. Humans are caught in this endless struggle. 
They can never hope to resolve it, because the pressure of the id is constant, as is the control 
needed to keep it at bay. The struggle makes for a miserable, discontented human existence. 
Freud’s view entails that we need the id projections of fetishistic photography and Other 
construction. Furthermore, no effort will be successful in restraining them, since there is no 
way to lessen the pressure of the id. Consequently one might as well surrender and let 
photography fall wholly into the hands of those who wish to exploit its projective potential. 
Indeed it looks like this is exactly what has happened in the last decade. The spread of 
sexually explicit images, for instance, testifies to that. 
Nevertheless, I cannot subscribe to Freud’s pessimism. I cannot accept the inevitability of it. 
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that humans will always need ways to relieve id desires by 
projection onto an Other, but I do not think that this is a process that is invariable and totally 
beyond our control. And I do not believe that the only forces that can keep it at bay are 
sanctions by the greater community. I think that an equally successful strategy may be to offer 
alternatives. Faced with these alternatives, people may choose to ignore the id gratification 
and choose differently. The alternative when it comes to photography is narrative 
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photography. I believe that it can be a more satisfying alternative than the projective, shallow 
and fragmented approach of fetishistic photography. 
 
How does Goldin fare when it comes to expressing the subjective narrative truths of her 
subjects? Well, I have already pointed out that her post 1980 pictures seem to be more 
fragmented and fetishistic than the earlier black-and-white ones. I have also pointed out that 
the black-and-white photos seem to tell a more comprehensive story – a “richer” story – than 
the colour pictures (chapter 2.5 and 2.6). 
It is not easy to know for sure whether or not the black-and-white photographs tell a “truer” 
story than the colour photos – whether or not the “voice” that is there to a greater extent 
belongs to the subjects. But I think that it is likely. We know that Goldin lived very close to 
her transgender friends for an extended period in the early 1970s. So she knew them 
intimately. I do not think that she spent an equal amount of time with a specific group of 
transgender people after that. Knowing the 1970s crowd more intimately would have helped 
her to find their true voice. 
It is also possible to speculate that Goldin’s success after 1980 – a success at least in part 
owing to the sensational pictures of sex and violence in The Ballad of Sexual Dependency – 
may have prompted her to include similar elements in her The Other Side photos. It is 
conceivable that this shifted her focus from the “voice” of her subjects to her audience’s 
demand for the sensational. The photos would then depict not the true subjective narratives of 
her subjects, but the projections of the spectators – in the way that Goldin interpreted them. 
This may offer one explanation to the increased fetishistic quality that I have found in her post 
1980 colour photographs. I feel that such an explanation is also supported by the fact that she 
actually becomes a “tourist” documentary photographer herself – on her trip to Thailand and 
the Philippines – resulting in photographs that seem incongruous, heterogeneous and 
consequently less narrative. Furthermore, it seems probable that circumstances in the society 
at large – the fragmentation of grand narratives and authority, and its consequences – would 
have favoured a fetishistic approach. 
Anyway, to me her 1970s pictures tell the most credible story. Looking at them I feel that I 
hear the voices of roommate, Ivy, Colette, Naomi and the others, and I feel that I am told the 
story about their life the way they want it to be told. I think that Nan Goldin’s black-and-white 
pictures make for great narrative photography – on the same level as Christer Strömholm, 
Mary Ellen Mark and Larry Clark’s Tulsa. 
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I want to end this chapter with a picture from The Other Side. It is Tabboo! and Misty at the 
pier (taken in New York City in 1991)133. It depicts the two subjects, hand in hand, with their 
backs to the camera. They are dressed in casual men’s wear – T-shirts and shorts. Misty wears 
a cap. They look like a couple of pretty inconspicuous guys in the New York night. The only 
hint that they are “different” from most other guys is the holding of hands. The fact that they 
look so “ordinary” even when we know they are not, and that they are facing away from us, 
may illustrate the main point of this chapter: They, and they alone, hold the key to their 
narratives. Their lives are theirs alone, and it is solely up to them whether or not they will 
share it with us. To me this is a picture of integrity and control of one’s own life story, and a 
reminder that there is more to a tale than what immediately meets the eye. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
133
 Goldin: The Other Side, page 81. 
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3. CONCLUSION. 
 
In this dissertation I have written about selected pictures from the photo-book The Other Side 
by artist Nan Goldin. My intention has been to show how they illustrate theories on gender 
issues, and the development of such theories from ca 1970 to 1992. I have also intended to 
show how the medium of photography may be employed to either affirm or to fragment new 
gender identities. I express my hopes that photographers will choose the first option. 
 
In chapter 2.1 my main concern was the roommate pictures. They illustrated a way that 
photographs may be employed to criticize gender discourse – or in this case specifically the 
two-gender system. They are examples of the subversive potential of the medium. 
All three of them show us a person who, at first glance, seems unquestionably to be a woman. 
Had we not encountered her in the setting of Goldin’s book, I do not think that we would have 
offered her gender a second thought. We would have accepted her as a woman at face value. 
But owing to the context of her presentation we know that she is not what we would call a 
regular female according to the two-gender system criteria. We know that she was born a 
biological man. But we also know that she now looks very much like a woman. According to 
the assumptions of the system it should not be possible. It states that there are two – and only 
two – genders. There can be no middle ground. But there she is nonetheless – our roommate. 
Her very existence threatens the stability of the system and makes us question its authority. In 
the 1980s and 90s queer theorists would do the same – probably exactly because of the 
existence of people like her. 
One who accepts at face value is Nan Goldin. To her roommate is a beautiful woman – one 
whom she wants to pay homage to with her book. It is as if though Goldin has understood that 
not all things in life can be readily categorized, and that that is a good thing. It is as if though 
she urges us to enjoy life’s diversity and its mysteries without prejudice or doubt. 
Her pictures may be said to celebrate the womanhood of roommate on two different levels. 
In the Roommate in the kitchen she is woman as idea. Her classical stance and the Pictorialist 
air of the photograph remove her from the earthly sphere. She is transcendent, aloof, existing 
as the female potential in us all. 
This potential is made flesh and blood in Roommate in her chair. The female potential has 
descended from the celestial domain and is made incarnate as woman. Thanks to the everyday 
setting and the straight photography quality of the picture it shows us roommate as a female 
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in the here and now. Even more so, she does not come across as just any woman, but as the 
natural woman par excellence. She is an affront to the teachings of the two-gender system 
indeed, according to which she is one of “nature’s mistakes” amenable to human intervention 
to return nature to Nature. 
Goldin accepts her, adores her, but not even she can escape the constraints of discourse. When 
she calls one of the roommate pictures Sisters, it is probably an acceptance of her as a woman, 
but it is also an admission of the lack of words to describe what discourse does not recognize. 
The 1970s roommate is a woman outside of discourse and language. 
 
Discourse on sex and gender has a long and varied history. In chapter 2.2 I reiterate parts of it 
in order to show the contingent nature of gender concepts. I also recapitulate the rise of 
feminism and its relation to those concepts. 
We have thus seen that before the 18th century the gender system was close to a one-gender 
system, with the male as the only gender and the female as a kind of “defective male”. These 
assumptions had their basis both in biblical interpretations and in writings from antiquity. The 
shift towards two separate genders occurred in the 18th and 19th century when man and 
woman were relegated to different spheres – the public and the domestic – according to their 
alleged gender characteristics. The fact that gender categorization shifted illustrates that 
gender systems are not self-evident, universal entities. 
The radical feminist movement in the 1960s and 70s criticized what they called patriarchal 
hegemony, but it still depended on keeping the two-gender system intact, relying on a 
coherent female category. All identities that didn’t fit into the theoretical framework were left 
out. Transgender identity was one. I used the Naomi in the audience photograph to illustrate 
biological women’s disdain for transgender people. 
Left out of discourse and having to fend for themselves, Goldin’s friends attempted to create 
their own life story narratives. Goldin has managed to capture some of those narratives in her 
pictures and to pass them on to the spectators by employing story-telling visual clues. The 
little girl in the picture on the wall in Roommate in the kitchen is one such clue. It points to 
femininity as formative of the transgender identity. The Warhol Marilyn poster in Ivy with 
Marilyn is another. It points to femininity, but also to glamour and the entertainment industry 
– additional identity foundations. The same is found in Christmas at The Other Side, where 
Ivy enters the world of old Hollywood romantic heroes. Colette at home illustrates both 
femininity and stardom, showing her in the vein of a classical film diva beauty. 
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Goldin’s 1970s pictures thus have a dual function as to gender identity. They can be seen to 
criticize the prevailing two-gender system. And they can be seen as illustrating and affirming 
the creation of an alternative transgender identity, as of yet outside mainstream gender 
discourse. 
 
One of the theoretical constructs that came under attack in 1960s and 70s feminism was 
psychoanalytical theory. This is the subject of chapter 2.3. In psychoanalytic theory gender 
differentiation depends on the presence or absence of a bodily organ – the penis. It is as such a 
theory of gender essentialism. The result of resolving the male Oedipus complex is a boy who 
emulates his father. He keeps his id energy (though repressed), so he therefore remains active 
– and he develops a strong super-ego (through incorporation of the masturbation and incest 
prohibition). He therefore has high morals. The girl, on the other hand – on discovering she 
has no penis – abandons her id energy altogether and hopes for a gift (penis/baby) from her 
father. She subsequently becomes passive. Having no masturbation or incest prohibition to 
incorporate she has a weaker super-ego and lower morals. 
The theory – conceived by Freud to be universal – was seen by radical feminists as an 
instance of patriarchal discrimination of the female gender. They criticized it and suggested 
alterations. Still they often depended on the theory as a basis for their critique. 
The transgender person would seem at odds with Freud’s model altogether. That someone 
would willingly remove the organ of pre-eminence – the penis – and seek out the derogated 
female position didn’t sit well with either psychoanalysts or feminists. 
The latter welcomed the re-workings of psychoanalytic theory by Jacques Lacan. To his mind 
the crux of gender differentiation was not the bodily organ of the penis, but the symbolic 
entity of the Phallus. Being a phantasmatic entity of plenitude and absolute mastery it could 
not really be said to exist anywhere other than in our longing for it. Feminists claimed the 
Phallus to be open to appropriation and re-signification, resulting in alternative gender 
differentiation models more affirming of female self-worth. Lacan also afforded women a 
place both inside and outside the Symbolic, stressing their role as “free agents”. As such they 
were not to such a high degree tied up with discourse and the Symbolic. 
The new possibilities for female affirmation as a result of Lacan’s theories may also apply to 
the transgender population. They too may appropriate and re-signify the Phallus, and they too 
must be considered “free agents” not tied up with the Symbolic. 
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As I have explained, the radical feminist critique of the 1960s and 70s did little to change the 
foundations of the two-gender system. The transgender people were left outside discourse. 
The first serious blow to the raison d’être of the system came with the advent of queer theory 
in the 1980s and 90s, as outlined in chapter 2.4. Paradoxically one of its preconditions was 
dissent within the women’s movement. Several groups felt that their situation did not 
correspond to that of its middle-class, all-white majority. They felt that their voice was not 
heard. A discussion of who has the authority to define the term “woman” resulted in the 
partial fragmentation of the concept. From those fragments arose the queer movement based 
not on uniformity but on identity diversity. 
The main queer theorist is Judith Butler. She did much to rob the two-gender system of its 
authority. According to Butler, gender is a purely social and cultural construct. It has no basis 
in any corporeal reality. The same goes for organic sex and the body – they are all discursive 
entities and cannot exist as anything else. In other words, Butler asserted that the body, sex 
and gender are relative, not universal, concepts dependent on their social and cultural context. 
She thus discounted gender identity as a stable, “inner” characteristic of humans. In her 
opinion gender is performative – that is that the acts that are said to express it actually 
construct it, and the language that is said to describe it actually creates it. Every time we act 
like a man or woman and every time we speak of men and women, we actually construct the 
categories of man and woman. To Butler this performative is all the gender identity there is. 
Like she says: “There is no doer behind the deed”. 
She criticizes patriarchal society for restricting gender identities to man and woman only, and 
calls for action to subvert the system. The two subversive tools she mentions are mis-
recognition of the system’s naming and parody. 
One would think that Butler’s doing away with the two-gender system would be an 
unequivocal benefit to transgender identity. After all, she calls for the affirmation of more 
gender expressions, and affords gender minorities the power to subvert the system. But still, 
as I have shown in my dissertation, the situation is not that simple. 
The problem is that Butler not only does away with the authority of the two-gender system, 
but with the authority of all gender systems. What results is an identity vacuum. In such a 
vacuum I believe that the identity narratives that suffer the most are those not bolstered by 
history and tradition. Transgender identity is exactly such an identity. 
The picture Joey on my bed illustrates my point. Here there is no critique of any particular 
gender system. Instead we find a playful exploration of the concept of desire. The spectator is 
invited to participate in the game. But the game has no end, and no answers are given. We 
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also find parody – most explicitly in the pudica gesture – and fetishistic elements, like the 
clothes of the subject and the overtly sexual ambience of the photograph. Still Joey emanates 
a humorous and confident sense of self-worth. 
That too is gone in Misty and Jimmy Paulette in a taxi. There is no playfulness in this picture. 
No games. No confidence. The twinkle in Joey’s eyes is replaced by the vacant expression of 
the two in the taxi. Here is parody, but on a different level than in the former picture. The 
wish to appropriate and express the feminine is abandoned in favour of a parody on drag 
itself. Misty and Jimmy are no longer plausible women. On their way to a parade in order to 
celebrate and propagate minority identities, one wonders what is the basis of the one they will 
be propagating. They do not look like people who have gotten their identity affirmed. There is 
no pride or sense of self-worth here. 
I believe that in this photograph Misty and Jimmy may illustrate what happens to people’s 
identity in the vacuum resulting from Foucault’s analysis, and queer and deconstructive 
critique. Lacking identity alternatives, emptiness ensues. 
 
In chapter 2.5 I have compared the black-and-white pictures from the 1970s with the colour 
ones taken after 1990 to look for signs of identity fragmentation. I have found several such 
signs. 
Goldin’s use of colour does not, in my opinion, connote increased reality, but rather a sense of 
being removed from everyday life to a place where the party goes on all week long. As a 
result, her world and the people in it look “unreal”. 
Her use of the snapshot composition device connotes chaos – a haphazard reality with little 
structuring support for identity formation. 
The “blur” – which in my opinion in the 70s pictures points to aloofness – gives the colour 
ones an expression of restlessness. It is as if her subjects – both their minds and their bodies – 
are falling apart, returning to the mute matter from whence they arose. 
Important is also that the narrative content of the latter photographs is diminished. The visual 
clues to connect the life stories of the subjects to that of the spectators are fewer, and the ones 
that are there seem more private and not as recognizable to a wider audience. 
As a result it seems fair to say that there is enough evidence – both thematically and formally 
– to substantiate the hypothesis that the colour pictures illustrate the (scholarly) fragmentation 
of gender identity of the 80s and 90s. 
This is seen quite clearly in the Kim at home. Compared to the Ivy with Marilyn and the 
Roommate in the kitchen the narrative content is gone from the former picture. What in the 
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Ivy- and roommate-photos served as visual clues to offer narrative support in the Kim-image 
has become a mere reference to a body part. The body part now fills the role of former 
comprehensive identity narratives. It is an impoverishment compared to the 1970s’ situation. 
 
In chapter 2.6 I introduce two kinds of documentary photography: narrative and fetishistic. 
Narrative photography seeks to tell the whole, comprehensive and true story of its subjects. Its 
intention is to let the spectator get to know the subjects on their own terms, and to make him 
or her sympathize with them on the grounds of our common humanity. To make the 
connection between subject and audience the photographer employs visual clues that have 
similar meanings in large segments of the population. Narrative photography presupposes that 
the artist is intimately familiar with the subjects so that he or she will be able to tell the whole, 
true story. Narrative photography aid the structuring forces of the psychological ego, and is an 
approach that may bolster and affirm identity positions.  
Fetishistic photography, on the other hand, works by the projection of id urges, often 
constructing the subjects as Other, alienating them. Its aim is not to get to know other people, 
but to rid the artist (and by proxy the spectators) of unpleasant yet tantalizing emotions, while 
still being able to enjoy them at a distance. These emotions often are of an immature sexual or 
aggressive nature and frequently utilize fetishes as their vehicle of expression. Thus fetishistic 
photography will often portray the sensational and the shocking. It works as a documentary, 
not of the subjects, but of the artist’s and the spectator’s ids. It actually tells us very little 
about its subjects. On the contrary, it bolsters prejudices. Thus this photographic approach can 
be detrimental to identity positions. 
Goldin’s picture Aphrodite and Javier at a sex party seems well suited to illustrate fetishistic 
photography. The subjects perform a kind of sexual theatre in the S&M vein. Aphrodite’s face 
is covered with layers of heavy make-up, revealing nothing of the person inside. Only the 
sexual role is apparent. 
 
In chapter 2.7 I speak more generally of the documentary photography tradition and its 
relation to the construction of the Other. I try to place Goldin’s pictures in it. 
At the turn of the 19th and 20th century new topics appeared on the scene, owing to both a 
political agenda to alleviate conditions for the poor and outcast, and a new aesthetic inspired 
by Walt Whitman. This included renderings of the Other. 
I have described different strategies in dealing with the Other as related to the “us” and 
“them” category. We have seen the distancing approach of Jacob Riis – keeping the “us” and 
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“them” categories intact, Weegee’s introduction of the Other next door and Robert Frank’s 
conversion of “us” (the American middle class) into Other. Larry Clark (in Tulsa), Christer 
Strömholm and Mary Ellen Mark attempt a humanizing widening of the “us” category. 
Clark’s later work seems to reopen the “us”-“them” divide. 
In this kind of photography one might speculate that there are different psychic structures at 
work. The id is always looking for new material to project its forbidden desires onto. Not 
being permitted by the ego to find that material in the “us” (or “me”) category it depends on 
the Other as alien and part of the “them” category. This construction of Other is the societal 
parallel to individual projection. The resulting photography tends to correspond to the id 
desires – irrational, highly emotional and fragmented. I have called it fetishistic photography. 
The structuring forces of the ego and its creation of comprehensive stories and schemata open 
up for a sympathetic, humanizing approach to the Other – enabling us to invite them into the 
fellowship of the “us” category. The corresponding approach in photography is what I have 
called narrative photography. Finally photography may also be a vehicle for mourning, as in 
family photography, keeping the psyche from falling into melancholia. 
I have suggested that Goldin’s 1970s pictures are examples of narrative photography – 
employing the humanizing widening of the “us” category of Clark in Tulsa, Strömholm and 
Mark. The post 1990 ones are more fetishistic and tied up with projection of id desires – 
constructing transgender identity as Other and belonging to the “them” category. 
 
In chapter 2.8 I have discussed Butler’s claim that there can be no body, sex or gender outside 
discourse. I have indicated the tautological nature of her reasoning, suggesting that what she 
is actually saying is that there can be no discursive body, sex or gender outside discourse. 
In my opinion there is ample evidence that there are several non-discursive elements that 
influence us. Examples are unknown entities in the present and the past, natural events, 
physiological processes, strong drives and strong emotions. The fact that they cannot be 
comprehended or conceptualised does not mean that they do not impact on our lives. I have 
called this kind of non-discursive knowledge “knowledge-in-being”, and related it to the 
Lacanian concept of the Real. Events in the Real are characterized by their being alien and 
autonomous – that is, beyond our control. 
There is no reason to believe that the Real cannot manifest itself in photography. Using the 
Jimmy Paulette and Tabboo! in the bathroom as example, I have pointed to Tabboo!’s 
inaccessibility and the spatial configuration as clues to show that some of the events in the 
picture take place on another, non-discursive level. They happen “elsewhere”. The slanting 
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corner/wall is to me the punctum of the photograph. I have vented the thought that a picture’s 
punctum may indeed correspond to events taking place in the (individual) Real. This opens up 
for the possibility that a photograph may contain vast amounts of non-discursive information. 
I have coined it “Real photography” – a genre impossible to practice, since Real events may 
be strictly individual, and cannot be planned or anticipated. 
Accepting the Real and its influence on our lives may prove an important lesson in humility, 
realising that we are all to some degree controlled by events beyond anyone’s control. It is 
also an alternative to Butler’s anthropocentric model, placing the human race in a wider 
context as only one part of a vast creation. 
 
In chapter 2.9 I have looked at Butler’s Asian pictures. The photographs point to the 
contingency of any gender system, since such systems differ with time and distance, and to 
the fact that gender systems may be based on “subjective” and “objective” truths alike. They 
also illustrate what happens when an artist ventures on new, unfamiliar ground. 
 
In chapter 2.10 I discuss the concepts of truth and authority and relate them to issues of 
gender identity. 
In my opinion both essentialism and constructivism must be dismissed as claimants to the 
whole, objective truth about sex and gender. We simply do not know enough to validate such 
a claim. Perhaps we never will. 
The Real may be one basis for subjective gender perception, but since it is non-discursive it 
can never be proved as such. 
Nevertheless, the truth about gender is – its non-factual nature notwithstanding – one of those 
important truths, vested with much emotional energy. As a result the discussions and 
arguments rage on. My question is who will have the power to create authoritative and at the 
same time non-discriminating gender narratives and truths. It is clear that we need them. 
Differentiating between objective and subjective truths, I claim that we all do, but only for 
ourselves. Lacking objective, comprehensive truths, only subjective truths can rightfully lay 
any claim to authority. Anyone is free to define one’s own gender. And no one can 
authoritatively dismiss it. 
The personal and sometimes private nature of gender identity I have illustrated with Goldin’s 
picture Tabboo! and Misty at the pier. It will always be up to the subjects how much, or little, 
they want to tell us about themselves. We need to respect their privacy, and not give in to our 
ids’ need for sensational and spectacular projection arenas.  
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Instead of giving in to id desires, photography can aid in the re-telling, communicating and 
affirming of gender stories. That is why I have called for narrative photography – to truthfully 
and comprehensively tell those stories as the subjects would have told them, with respect for 
their personal integrity. 
In my opinion Nan Goldin has succeeded in this in her 1970s black-and-white pictures. They 
tell the story of roommate, Ivy, Colette and the others in a plausible and personal, yet discreet 
way. I feel that I know them better. Her colour photographs do not succeed, I think. Jimmy 
Paulette, Misty, Tabboo!, Kim, Aphrodite and the others are more like clichés than complete 
transgender persons. As such they are subject to projection, fetishism and sensationalism. 
 
 
In my dissertation I have tried to show how photography may aid in the creation and 
affirming of comprehensive and subjectively true gender narratives. Allowing for personal 
integrity and the influence of the Real, we are compelled to avoid sensationalism, speculative 
exploitation and discriminating “truths” laying claim to universal validity. 
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